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ABSTRACT 
Recent trends in climate change in combination with strong pressing on the weak stable 
high mountain natural environment may lead to a degradation of permafrost sites, 
glacier deviation, development of destructive processes in soils, and instability of 
natural and man-caused objects, including ecologically hazardous ones, to which it is 
necessary to add the mining waste storage tailings. Nowadays we do possess sufficient 
knowledge and there is a few data allowing to safety prediction of long term interaction 
of hydraulic facilities with natural high-level geologic environment.  But, the permanent 
climate changing complicates the analysis of future events. 
 
This thesis shows an Environmental Risk Analysis (ERA) for systematic and 
comprehensive study of the status of Petrov’s glacial lake also it's possible assessment 
of the hazard it pose and of the vulnerability of downstream people and property. The 
main purpose of the study is the impact of outburst wave of the lake on a nearly tailings 
pond of "Kumtor" mining company. The possibility of this scenario would lead to an 
ecological catastrophe not only in Kyrgyzstan but also throughout Central Asia. 
 
Several possible factors have been selected for ERA in the development of events. In the 
study took into account the annual water increasing in the lake, seismic activity and 
structure (moraine dam) of the study area, the possible events in the tailings after the 
flood. 
 
Further practice of object using, detailed monitoring of dam state, engineering- 
geological and geophysical surveying on the laying area revealed a whole series of 
factors (conditions and processes), which may lead to an object failure with disastrous 
environmental effects. Symbolically there are three groups of risk factors:  
 
 internal physico-geological factors in dam foundation and in Petrov’s moraine 
dam body triggering its instability;  
 hydrogeological and hydrological factors within a catchment area;  
 glaciologic and thermodynamic processes. 
 
 
This analysis was conducted using the International Standard ISO 14031 Environmental 
performance evaluation and Environmental Risk Assessment, March 1999. To get to 
quantify the risks of each these cases, it is necessary to identify and familiarize 
themselves with the most commonly reported accidents and identified from the 
historical sources that initiated these accidents (initiators). With these accidents 
recreated in an event tree; by which assesses the potential consequences associated with 
failure on a simulating of alteration in the process, the event trees used a prospective 
analysis (from an initiating event is determine their possible consequences). 
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RESUMEN DE LA TESIS 
Las últimas tendencias en el cambio climático, en combinación con una fuerte presión 
sobre el debil entorno natural estable de alta montaña pueden dar lugar a una 
degradación del permafrost, desviacion glaciar, el desarrollo de los procesos 
destructivos en los suelos y la inestabilidad de origen natural y humano – objetos 
causados, incluyendo ecologicamente peligrosos, a los que hay que añadir los relaves 
mineros de almacenamiento de residuos. 
 
Esta tesis muestra un Análisis de Riesgos Ambientales para el estudio sistemático y 
exhaustivo de la situación del lago glacial de Petrov también es posible la evaluación de 
la amenaza que plantean y de la vulnerabilidad de las personas y de los bienes 
intermedios. Pero el objetivo principal del estudio es el impacto de la onda de explosión 
del lago en una balsa de residuos cerca de la minera "Kumtor". La posibilidad de este 
escenario llevaría a una catástrofe ecológica no sólo en Kirguistán sino también en toda 
Asia Central. 
 
Para el análisis de riesgos se ha seleccionado varios factores posibles en el desarrollo de 
los acontecimientos. En el estudio se tuvo en cuenta el agua anual cada vez mayor en el 
lago, la actividad y la estructura sísmica (presa morrena) del área de estudio, los 
posibles eventos en los relaves después del diluvio. 
 
Además la práctica de los objetos que  utilizan, un seguimiento detallado del estado de 
la presa, la ingeniería  - geológica y estudios  geofísicos en la zona por la que se puso de 
manifiesto toda una serie de factores (las condiciones y procesos), lo que puede 
conducir a un fallo del objeto con efectos desastrosos en el entorno. Simbólicamente hay 
tres grupos de factores de riesgo: 
 
 Factores físico-geológicos internos en fundación de la presa y en el cuerpo de la 
presa provocando su inestabilidad. 
 Factores hidrogeológicos e hidrológicos dentro de un área de influencia.  
 Procesos glaciológicos y termodinámicos. 
 
Este análisis se llevó a cabo mediante la evaluación del desempeño ambiental Norma 
Internacional ISO 14031 y Evaluación de Riesgos Ambientales, de marzo de 1999. Para 
llegar a cuantificar los riesgos de cada uno de estos casos, es necesario identificar y 
familiarizarse con los accidentes con mayor frecuencia e identificada  a partir de las  
fuentes históricas que iniciaron estos accidentes (iniciadores). Con estos accidentes 
recreados en un árbol de eventos; por el que se evalúan las posibles consecuencias 
relacionadas con el fracaso en una simulación de la alteración del proceso, los árboles 
de sucesos utilizan un análisis prospectivo (a partir de un suceso iniciador es posible 
determinar sus consecuencias). 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Natural hazards and dangerous geological events are common throughout the Tien-
Shan Mountains which are characterized by very diverse landscapes, ecological and 
climatic conditions and geological environments, and by intense geodynamic activity. 
The most destructive natural hazards are earthquakes, landslides, rockslides, mountain 
lake outburst floods, and mudslides. Natural and man-made hazards resulting from 
climate change and strong anthropogenic impacts on the mountain environments have 
become widespread in the Tien Shan in recent 10-15 years and intensified “common” 
exogenetic geological processes (EGP) and triggered new ones. Among the natural and 
man-made hazards the biggest perils are induced seismicity, water logging, glaciers and 
permafrost degradation, cryogenic processes, accidents at large engineering facilities 
(open pits, tailing dumps, dams, etc.). There is an assessment of climate change impacts 
on the natural and man-made hazards intensification in the mountainous regions of 
Kyrgyzstan below. 
 
In according to the information from the KR Ministry of Emergency Situations, from 
2000 to 2008 the average number of yearly natural disasters and emergency situations of 
geological origin (earthquakes, mudslides, landslides) was 76, which is 1.2 times greater 
the average number of natural disasters that occurred between 1990 and 1999 and 1.6 
times greater as compared to the period from 1980 to 1989. For example, in 1990-1999, 
297 mudslides were reported whereas in 2000-2013 there were 368 mudslides. It is 
worthy of note that the period from 1997 to 2007 was the warmest period on record, and 
in 2000-2013 the average annual temperature was 0.2°C higher than in the 1990-s. 
Therefore, we have reasonable grounds to believe that the number of natural and man-
made hazards increased as a result of climate changes in the Tien Shan Mountains. 
 
One of the hazardous consequences of climate warming is the degradation of glaciers 
and permafrost followed by glacial lake outburst floods, mudslides and other EGP. In 
the late 20th century, the Kyrgyz Tien-Shan contained 5,237 glaciers covering the total 
area of 6,336    . Fresh water contained in those glaciers whose runoff makes up 30-
50% of the total summer river runoff in mountains is the most essential natural resource 
of not only Kyrgyzstan but the entire Central Asia. As the climate products and the 
unique indicators of climate changes, the glaciers react to any changes in air 
temperature and humidity. 
 
Also, widespread glacier recession leads to formation and/or expansion of glacial lakes 
that may burst as the result of continuing climate warming and rapid melting of their 
ice dams. 
 
The Petrov’s Glacier, which is the largest glacier in the Naryn (Syrdarya) River Basin, 
has been rapidly recessing in the recent years as dust coating from blasting operations 
1. INTRODUCTION 
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at the Kumtor Mine accelerated its natural melting. Glacier retreat is followed by 
expansion of the Petrov’s Lake that may end in a lake outburst flood due to the buried 
glacier ice melting in the lake moraine dam. 
 
As a result of glacier recession, the lake volume increased from 23.1 million    in 1978 
to 105.8 million    in 2013. The release of such water amount can have disastrous 
consequences. In particular, the hydrodynamic wave can destroy the tailings dump 
located downstream the Kumtor River (which is the head of the Naryn River) and 
containing 43 million  of cyanide bearing wastes. 
 
The situation gets even worse as due to rapid melting of frozen loamy soils in the 
bottom of the tailings dump, the dam that holds the tailings began deforming and 
moving. In the worst case scenario (an earthquake followed by collapse of the glacier 
and/or opening of cavities within the glacier or ice dam), a local glacial lake outburst 
flood may lead to contamination of the Naryn River Basin with toxic wastes thus posing 
a danger for the whole region. To prevent a catastrophic outburst flood event, the water 
level in the Petrov’s Lake and the moraine-ice dam are monitored constantly and 
technical proposals on how to decrease the water level are being developed. 
 
From the experience of the Kumtor Gold Project (3,700-4,200 m a.s.l.), out of all other 
components of the mountain zone, permafrost is the most prone to the climate 
warming. Human activity triggers permafrost degradation and thus causes drastic and 
irreversible changes in its physical (strength, deformation, thermal physics, filtration, 
etc.) and geotechnical (bearing capacity, subsidence, etc.) properties. At the Kumtor 
Gold Mine such changes in the properties and cryogenic structure of permafrost finally 
led to the tailings dam deformation and movement, thermal erosion and subsidence 
followed by water seepage in areas with the drainage and diverting ditches, solifluction 
and creep processes on slopes undercut by roads and the pulp line, ground subsidence 
under buildings and structures, and landslides and rock slides in the open pit resulting 
in considerable economic loss and people death.  
 
The above examples of increasing danger and risks and natural and man-made hazards 
highlight the importance of monitoring climate changes and mining activity in high 
mountain regions and forecasting changes in geotechnical and ecological conditions 
and potentially dangerous in geodynamically active regions of the Tien-Shan. 
Otherwise, the continuing global warming may trigger catastrophic processes on a 
regional scale. 
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1.2 Research Goals and Objectives 
The present study had two main objectives:  
 
a) to analyze of risk to Glacial lake outburst flood GLOF hazards in a Petrov’s Lake,  
b) in particular, due to risks  of accident at  tailings pond (waste mining) by glacial 
lake outburst flood in the territory of The Kumtor active gold-mining company 
(Kyrgyz Republic) and 
c) to develop recommendations for adaptation to, and mitigation of  hazards; 
 
This three-fold objective requires both an assessment of the extent to which specific 
glacial lakes are unstable, and an analysis of the degree to which people and property 
downstream are vulnerable.  This work will contribute to the study of an overall 
strategy for risk management which will include a more precise identification of the 
hazard as well as early warning and mitigation measures. As the physical attributes of 
Petrov’s glacial lake are similar throughout the Tian-Shan region. 
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2. GLACIER LAKES OF KYRGYZSTAN 
2.1 General information about glaciers of Kyrgyzstan 
Tien Shan is one of the largest mountain systems in Asia stretching 2,000 km from west 
to east between       N and   –     E. Glaciers of Tien Shan (Figure 2.1) spread in 
altitudinal belt between 2,800 m a.s.l. and 7,400 m a.s.l. and inters one of the major 
sources of water in central Asia endorheic basins feeding the Aral-Caspian, Balkhash, 
Issik Kul, and Tarim hydrographic systems. The glaciers of Tien Shan are supplying 
water for approximately 50 million populations of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, 
northern Tajikistan, and Xinjiang supporting the low lands agriculture, urban, and 
industrial areas. Most of which are located on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. 
 
a) 
 
b) 
 
c) 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Tien Shan Mountains: a) Tien Shan mountain system in space image; b) Khan 
Tengri Peak (kaz. "King Heaven") is located on the China—Kyrgyzstan—Kazakhstan 
border; c) Foothills of the Tien Shan. 
 
The latest investigations over the whole mountains on the territory of Kyrgyzstan based 
on remote sensing data numbers 7,590 glaciers with total area of 8100     (about 30% 
of the total land area of the Kyrgyz Republic) and 1,840     volume of ice. There are 
different types of glaciers in Kyrgyzstan, from large valley and dendrite glaciers, 
prevalent in central Tien Shan, to small lobes, niche glaciers in all Tien Shan alpine 
areas. Large valley glaciers form 82% of the Tien Shan total glacier area. The glaciers 
themselves cover about 4% of the surface area of the country. 
2. GLACIER LAKES OF KYRGYZSTAN 
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The most famous is the Enilchek Glacier – actually there are two branches –Northern 
and Southern in the Peak Pobeda (7439 m), Khan Tengri (6995 m) massif in the Eastern 
Tien Shan. 
 
Some glaciers are within easy reach of Bishkek, (for example the Ak Sai (3500 m) and 
Adygene (3200 m) in Ala Archa National park), and several companies offer two or 
three day treks to them. 
 
Here is a list of some of the major glaciers to be found in the republic. Different sources 
sometimes give different figures for their length and area – possibly a sign of the effects 
of climate change. 
Table 2.1 Main glaciers on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. 
Glacier Location River 
Length  
(  ) 
Area 
(   ) 
Altitude  
(m) 
Southern 
Enilchek 
Pobeda/Khan 
Tengri 
Enilchek 60.5 632.3 908 
Northern 
Enilchek 
Pobeda/Khan 
Tengri 
Mezebacher 
Lakes 
32.8 215.2 1040 
Kayingdi 
Pobeda/Khan 
Tengri 
Kayingdi 29.0 97.2 1040 
Korjinevskovo Zapaiski Ridge Djanai Dartak 21.5 99.4 1885 
Mushketova 
Pobeda/Khan 
Tengri 
Arir Ter 20.5 71.3 1050 
Semyenova 
Pobeda/Khan 
Tengri 
Sary Jaz 20.2 64.5 1020 
Lenin Lenin Achik Tash 13.5 58.1 1150 
Mushketova Kakshaal Kotur 13.3 23.0 1200 
Nalivkina Kakshaal Ai-Tala 13.2 19.5 1210 
Keikal 
Pobeda/Khan 
Tengri 
Terekti 12.9 26.8 1030 
Petrov’sa Ak Sheirak Kumtor 14.3 73.9 1010 
2. GLACIER LAKES OF KYRGYZSTAN 
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2.2 Mapping of Glaciers and Glacial Lakes of Kyrgyzstan. 
 Mapping Glaciers 
 
The methodology used for mapping Kyrgyzstan’s glaciers follows the 
recommendations developed for the World Glacier Inventory (WGI) by Müller at the 
Temporary Technical Secretariat (TTS), Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (SFIT), 
Zurich. 
 
The attributes of glaciers used in mapping are as follows: 
1. Unique identifier (basin and sub-basin name, glacier name, latitude, longitude, 
and highest, lowest, and mean elevations) 
2. Physical parameters (area, length, and orientation of glacier)  
3. Glacier type (class)  
4. Source of database and date 
 
Ideally, glacier information should be compiled from a single source over a narrow 
temporal range. This opportunity was offered more closely when images became 
available from Landsat, 7, since these have a narrower temporal base (2005±3 years). 
These images were used to prepare a new inventory, which therefore provides a more 
accurate base for analysis. Furthermore, the new mapping process was undertaken by 
applying a Arc Map software to delineate glacier boundaries.  
 
The 1987 inventory identified 6771 glaciers in Nepal covering an area of 8009,4    . The 
new inventory prepared using the Landsat 5 and 7 images mapped 5237 glaciers with a 
total area of 6336     (Figure 2.2 and Table 2.2) 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Comparison of the number of glaciers of 1987 and 2010 inventory 
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Table 2.2 Distribution of glaciers in the Kyrgyzstan Mountains. 
  1987 glacier inventory 2010 glacier inventory 
Range No. of Glaciers Total Area 
(   ) 
No. of Glaciers Total Area 
(   ) 
Tien Shan 5329 6298,4 3836 4660 
Pamir Alai 1442 1711 1401 1676 
Total 6771 8009,4 5237 6336 
 
 
 Mapping Glacial Lakes 
For the inventory, glacial lakes were defined as all lakes in a river basin that lie above 
3,500 m, and are fed by glacial melt (Figure 2.3). The altitude was selected as 
representing the approximate lower limit of glacial moraine accumulations in 
Kyrgyzstan. Glacial lakes may also exist beneath or within glaciers, but these are not 
usually visible on aerial images and so cannot be mapped. Thus such lakes were not 
included. 
 
Information on the elevation of the glacial lakes was derived from the Shuttle Radar 
Transmission Mission Digital Elevation Model (SRTM DEM) and Advanced Space-
borne Thermal Emission and Reflection Radiometer (ASTER) Global DEM. This data 
source was used to detect the boundaries of glacial lakes and to help classify them. 
Google Earth satellite images were used to verify the glacial lake inventory data. A 
combination of open source remote sensing and GIS software packages, such as Google 
Earth, were used to edit, manage, and analysis the data. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Location of glacial lakes in Tien Shan 
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Detection of glacial lakes 
Detection of glacial lakes using multispectral imagery involves discriminating between 
water and other types of surface. Delineation of surface water can be achieved using 
spectral reflectance differences. Water strongly absorbs light in the near- and middle-
infrared wavelengths (0.8 – 2.5 µm). The Normalized Difference Water Index (NDWI) 
was used for automated glacial lake detection followed by visual interpretation. DEM 
and Google Earth were used for better visualization, especially for lakes in shadow 
and/or snow-covered areas (Figure 2.4). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Example of glacier map derived from ASTER data. a) ASTER colour 
composite image (4,3,2 - RGB) red is ground and cyan is glacier b) Ratio image of bands 
7 and 4 enhance glacier (based on difference in spectral reflectance) which are the white 
areas c) glacier map  
 
 
2.3 Formation of glacier lakes. 
Glacier-dammed lakes form in a number of different situations. The largest lakes, which 
present the greatest hazards, occur in ice free tributary valleys blocked off by active 
valley glaciers. Most common are small lakes situated in alcoves and niches in the 
valley walls along the margins of glaciers and in depressions formed where tributary 
valley glaciers join. A few lakes are located slightly above the regional firm line; the 
large majority occurs along the lower reaches of glaciers. 
 
Intensity of ice thawing sharply increases in such conditions and glacial waters volume 
increases. 
 
Closing off of water way by a glacier it begins to fill with melt water and rain water 
from the surrounding basin. The resulting lake continues to fill until the water 
overflowing or initiates a dumping process at the ice dam. Filling continues at a 
reduced rate during the winter by water draining from the porous old snow in the 
higher areas of nearby glaciers. Winter snowfall also adds to the lake height.  
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2.3.1 Types of glacier lakes 
In Kyrgyzstan, the last decade has been formed hundreds of glacial lakes. Annual 
increase in temperature, also the impact of human factors leads increase in the volume 
of glacial lakes and their possible outburst floods. 
 
The glacial lakes were classified broadly into moraine-dammed, ice-dammed, erosion, 
and other lakes. The detailed classification is summarized in Table 2.3 and Figure 2.5 
Some of the more common types of lake in Nepal are described in the following. 
 
 
 Moraine-dammed lake: As a glacier tongue thins and retreats, meltwater can 
become trapped in the trough between the glacier terminus and its end moraine. 
Lakes may also accumulate along the glacier margins, between the lateral 
moraine and the valley side. Depending on the topography of the glacial 
foreland inside the end moraine, small lakes may also accumulate in the 
numerous depressions that are characteristic of the terrain. 
 
 Supra-glacial lakes: The only ice-dammed lakes identified in Nepal are supra-
glacial lakes. The recent period of atmospheric warming has caused many of the 
glaciers in the Nepal Himalayas to thin. The lower tongues of a large number of 
these glaciers are almost completely mantled with morainic debris and rock fall 
from the surrounding valley walls. In the early stages of down melting, small 
ponds accumulate within the surface moraine. These ponds are inherently 
unstable and may drain glacially or through a lateral moraine before reaching 
significant dimensions. In many cases, however, they have grown in size as 
glacier melt continued, and have amalgamated into progressively larger supra-
glacial lakes. While most of these lakes originate as small ponds, their 
progressive expansion has produced some of the largest of the Himalayan lakes. 
As lake expansion and glacial retreat continue, these supra-glacial lakes may 
merge with end-moraine dammed lakes. Because of the enormous volume of 
such lakes, they are often perceived to be among the most critical. 
 
 Erosion lakes: Glacial erosion lakes are bodies of water that form following glacial 
erosion and “over-deepening”. They exist in a variety of forms such as in 
depressions formed by cirque glaciers and as glacial valley lakes that 
accumulated in depressions after the eroding glacier retreated or disappeared. 
They may be partially dammed by very old end moraines. They have usually 
been in existence for hundreds or even thousands of years 
 
 Other glacial lakes: Rock falls, debris flows, and landslides often send masses of 
rock and soil debris on to valley floors damming local streams originating in 
glaciers. Bodies of water may also form amongst the uneven hummocks created 
by these deposits.  
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Table 2.3 Classification of glacial lakes. 
Glacier lake type Definition Notes 
Moraine-dammed
 lake 
Lake dammed by moraine 
following glacial retreat 
 
End-moraine dammed
 lake 
Lake dammed by end (terminal) 
moraines 
Usually touches the walls of the 
side moraines, but the water is 
held back by the end moraine 
(dam), lake usually, but not 
necessarily, in contact with the 
glacier, and may have glacier ice at 
the lake bottom (defined in some 
other classifications as "advanced 
form of supra-glacial"). 
Lateral moraine dammed 
lake (ice free) 
Lake dammed by lateral moraine(s) 
not in contact with glacial ice 
Lake is held back by the outside 
wall of a lateral moraine, i.e., away 
from the formerglacial path; lake 
may be in the fork formed between 
two lateral moraines of a main 
glacier and a glacier in a 
tributary valley; ‘ice free’ means 
the lateral moraine itself is no 
longer in contact with the glacier. 
Lateral moraine dammed 
lake (with ice) 
Lake dammed by lateral moraine(s) 
in contact with glacial ice 
As above, but the lateral moraine 
is in contact with the glacier ice. 
Other moraine dammed 
lake 
Lake dammed by other moraines 
(includes kettle lakes and 
thermokarst lakes) 
 
Ice-dammed lake Lakes dammed by glacier ice  
Supra-glacial lake 
Pond or lake on the surface of a 
glacier 
Most common type of ice-dammed 
lake in the Tien Shan region 
Glacier ice-dammed lake 
Lake dammed by glacier ice with 
no lateral moraines 
Dammed by the glacier ice, with 
no lateral moraine; can be at the 
side of a glacier between the 
glacier margin and valley wall. 
Glacier erosion lake 
Bodies of water that form as a 
result of an earlier glacial erosion 
process, which accumulate in 
depressions after the glacier has 
retreated or melted away 
 
Cirque lake A small pond occupying a cirque  
Glacier trough valley 
lake 
Lakes formed in the glacier trough 
as a result of the glacier erosion 
process 
For example ribbon lakes 
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Other glacier erosion 
lake 
Bodies of water occupying 
depressions formed by the glacial 
erosion process; these are usually 
located on the mid-slope of hills, 
but not necessarily in a cirque. 
 
Other glacial lakes 
Lakes formed in a glaciated valley, 
and fed by glacial melt, but 
damming material not directly part 
of the glacial process 
 
 Debris-dammed lake 
Lake formed by dam following a 
debris fall, rock avalanche, or 
landslide in a glacial valley and 
fed by glacial melt 
 Artificial lake 
Lake formed by a man-made dam 
in a glacial valley and fed by 
glacial melt 
 Other lakes fed by glacial melt  
 
 
   
   
   
 
Figure 2.5 Classification of glacial lakes; a) end moraine-dammed lake; b) lateral 
moraine dammed lake (ice free); c) lateral moraine dammed lake (with ice); d) supra-
glacial lake; e) glacier ice-dammed lake; f) cirque lake; g) glacier trough valley lake; h) 
debris-dammed lake; i) artificial lake. 
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In Kyrgyzstan, over 200 glacier lakes exist, of which about 10 have been classified as 
hazardous. The largest lakes are the Merzbacher, Petrov’s and Ala-Archa lakes, which 
are situated at an altitude between 4,000 and 4,500 m. In the Kumtor valley, the height 
of the valley floor decreases from 4,500 m to 3,600 m. It's vertical distance of only 20 km, 
which provides a rather steep angle of slope and high erosional flow velocities of 
potential floods. 
 
 
2.4 Potential hazards by glacier lake outbursts 
Among glacier hazards, glacier lake outburst floods (GLOF) possess the most far impact 
zone. The devastating effect itself is significantly dependent from the peak discharge, 
which is in general much higher than that of floods triggered by rainfall or snowmelt.  
 
From the historical record, glacier hazards are comparatively well described from the 
European Alps, where during the Little Ice Age (1600–1850) especially advancing 
tributary glaciers have dammed the main valley (e.g., impoundment of the Saaser Vispa 
by the Allalin glacier).   
 
The general glacier melting around the world during the twentieth century has led to a 
shift in the glacial systems and therefore in the glacial hazard potential. The glacier 
retreat has become obvious in the accelerated formation of moraine-dammed lakes in 
the Himalayas since 1950s and the Peruvian Andes. With the augmented settlement 
density in high mountain regions, the hazard potential has increased in some areas. 
This is especially true for valley settlements that are dependent on the irrigation of 
glacial melt water. 
 
In the Kyrgyzstan glacier hazards have reached a wider recognition by the outbreak of 
the Yashylkol in the Isfayram Say July 18, 1966. The lake outburst has been triggered by 
an ice avalanche, falling into the lake and caused a high flood wave. This type of Lake 
Outburst may be one of the major hazards in high mountain areas in the future. A lot of 
glaciers are in the transition from small-sized valley glaciers, reaching just the foot of 
the mountain, to hanging glaciers. However, most of the settlements in the Tian Shan 
are located at the slopes or even on mountain ridges, in a rather flood location. The 
main hazards are generated by the outburst of glacier-dammed lakes. Moreover, their 
formation and outburst is highly unpredictable. Glacier advances in this region would 
lead to an increase in glacier-dammed lakes and in turn to a higher hazard potential.  
 
 
2.5 Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOF) 
A glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF) is a type of outburst flood that occurs when the 
dam containing a glacial lake fails. This is also called by its Icelandic name, "Jökulhlaup". 
The dam can consist of glacier ice or a terminal moraine. Failure can happen due to 
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erosion, a buildup of water pressure, an avalanche of rock or heavy snow, an 
earthquake, volcanic eruptions under the ice, or if a large enough portion of a glacier 
breaks off and massively displaces the waters in a glacial lake at its base.  
According to the information, Kyrgyzstan has experienced at least 18 GLOF events in 
the past. Of these, 10 are believed to have occurred in Kyrgyzstan itself, and 8 were the 
result of flood surge over spills across the China border (Figure 2.6, Table 2.4). 
 
Among the 10 GLOF events known to have occurred in Kyrgyzstan, one took place in 
the distant past; five of recent date are quite well recorded; and eight of indeterminate 
date and two of recent date were recorded as occurrences, but without details of the 
losses incurred. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Location of GLOF events caused damage in Kyrgyzstan 
  
Table 2.4 GLOF events recorded in Kyrgyzstan. 
 Date River basin Lake Cause Losses 
Entirely within Kyrgyzstan 
1 21.07.2012 Ala Archa Tez Tor Moraine 
collapse 
Not Known 
2 20.07.2008 Ton Zyndan Moraine 
collapse 
3 Human lives, bridges, 
others 
3 05.07.2007 Jeruy Jeruy Moraine 
collapse 
Not Known 
4 01.07.2005 Nooruz Takyr Tor Moraine 
collapse 
Human lives, bridges, 
others 
5 16.05.2005 Issyk Issyk Moraine 
collapse 
Not Known 
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6 18.07.1966 Isfayram Say Yashylkul Moraine 
collapse 
Human lives, bridges, 
others 
7 Unknown Chuy Almatinka Moraine 
collapse 
Not Known 
8 Unknown Alay Rankul Moraine 
collapse 
Not Known 
9 Unknown Alay Shor Kul Ice avalanche Not Known 
10 Unknown Sary Jaz Arun Ice avalanche Not Known 
 
Zyndan (20 August 2008) 
This event was investigated by based on digital processing of Landsat satellite data, also 
was writed a detailed article. However, there is some disagreement between the two 
about both the cause and manner of the actual outburst and the total volume of water 
released. 
 
Yssyk (16 May 2005)  
A GLOF event in the Issyk basin occurred due to the collapse of a moraine in the Issyk 
river basin. This lake has since reformed to a critical level and is thus included in the 
potentially dangerous category. 
 
Yashylkul (18 July 1966) 
The Yashylkul GLOF is the most dangerous event of its type in Kyrgyzstan. Thus only 
the most salient points are discussed here in a little more detail. 
 
Takyr Tor Lake (01 July 2005) 
Takyr Tor Lake discharged when its end-moraine dam collapsed. Few details are 
available although it is known that some houses were destroyed and some farmland 
was torn away. 
 
Jeruy (05 July 2007) 
This GLOF was triggered when an ice avalanche hit the frontal lake and induced a 
surge wave which overtopped the end moraine dam. 
 
Tez-Tor lake(21 July 2012)  
The GLOF event occurred on the Ala-Archa River from Tez-Tor lake as a result of 
moraine collapse: details of the damage are not known. 
 
Others 
In addition to the events described above, four GLOFs have been identified in 
Kyrgyzstan from analysis of geomorphological features seen on satellite images and 
aerial photographs. Precise dates and details of the events are not available; however all 
are known to have occurred when the end moraines collapsed. Two events were 
identified in the Alay basin; one in the Sary Jaz; and one in the Chuy. 
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Some events have led to substantial economic losses, for example Zyndan Lake 
outburst in Ton region (Kyrgyzstan) 2008. For the majority of mountain glaciers around 
the world, recent decades have been characterized by an increasingly negative glacier 
mass balance and consequent glacier shrinkage and termini retreat attributed to rapid 
climatic warming. Projections of future climate indicate that this trend will continue. 
The observed and projected data shows a accelerating glacier lake formation. The 
number, area and volume of hazardous glacier lakes are increasing in mountain areas. 
This process combined with increasing land use activity in some mountain areas could 
lead to extensive damage and signiﬁcant life loss in the case of unexpected GLOFs. 
 
Recent studies of glacier lakes have been focused on lake detection using satellite/aerial 
imagery. They were helping to determine outburst mechanisms, dam stability 
assessment and outburst ﬂood modeling. Simple techniques to determine glacial lake 
outburst probability and to assess possible outburst ﬂood distances have been 
proposed. 
 
But up to now, the short-term forecast of GLOF as well as the prediction of GLOF 
inundation area and depth is still a challenge. To obtain new data on glacier lake 
behavior in order to improve the short-term outburst forecast, it is necessary to carry 
out continuous monitoring of glacier lakes that threaten to outburst in the near future. 
Such monitoring is also important because the hazard potential of particular glacier 
lakes could change rapidly within just a few years. 
 
 
2.6 Trigger mechanisms for glacier lake outburst flood (GLOF) 
The failure of dams occurs through a variety of different mechanisms: 
 
1. A very common outburst mechanism is the generation of displacement waves 
generated by ice avalanches or rock fall into the glacier lake. Subsequently, the 
flood creates a characteristic V-shaped incision into the moraine (Figure 2.5.b) or 
surges through an existent outlet channel and widens it rapidly. The natural 
spillway may be enlarged subsequently by retrogressive erosion. 
 
2. Glacier may induce displacement waves overtopping the moraine dam. At the 
glacier tongue, crevasses are located immediately behind the ice cliff and 
undercutting at the water line may accelerate the calving processes. Calving of 
glaciers into glacial lakes increases the lake size. Floating glacier tongues are 
considered to be highly dangerous. They can collapse catastrophically into the 
lake. 
 
3. Damage of ice cores increases the volume of the lake and poses a serious risk to 
dam stability. 
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4. Earthquakes may lead to a dam failure by mass movement and destabilization of 
the dam. 
 
5. The moraine dam may gradually become instable by infiltration, and the 
enlargement of drainage conduits in the moraine. This natural process is 
sometimes accelerated accidentally by artificial drainage measurements and 
leaking of the pipes. 
 
6. Catastrophic sub or englacial drainage of the glacier tongue area into the 
moraine-dammed lake may lead to a sudden rise of the water level in the glacial 
lake. 
 
7. Heavy rainfall or snow melt may increase the lake level abruptly and lead to an 
outburst. 
 
 
2.7 Hazard and Risk 
For GLOF events, the risk needs to be defined in relation to the people and property 
located downstream. This is by no means easy because the phenomenon that leads to 
the risk is extremely difficult to predict. It is also important to note that ‘at risk’ modern 
developments such as hydroelectric facilities, tourist hotels and tea shops, bridges, and 
roads have increased in number over the last twenty or more years and will continue to 
do so. Thus the scale of the risk envisaged is increasing. 
 
In general terms, risk is defined as a combination of the consequence and probability of 
the threatening event (the hazard) in relation to the vulnerability of the people and 
property that may be affected by the event. The Joint Technical Committee on Landslides 
and Engineered Slopes (JTC1) has defined risk as a ‘measure of the probability and 
severity of an adverse effect to life, health, property, or the environment’ (JTC1 2004). 
Thus, natural risks consist of two components: the hazard, i.e., the probability of a 
major natural event happening, and the severity, i.e., the potential casualties and/or 
damage. In simple terms;  
 
                              
 
Probability is defined as a "natural phenomenon that could lead to damage, described 
in terms of its geometry, mechanical, and other characteristics".  
 
Consequence is the outcome of an event and has an effect on objectives. A single event 
can generate a range of consequences which can have both positive and negative effects 
on objectives. Initial consequences can also escalate through knock-on effects. In the 
case of GLOFs, however, very few have ever occurred, either in Kyrgyzstan or in the 
neighboring mountains of China or Tajikistan, and repeat discharge from a single 
source is particularly rare. Often, once a moraine-dammed lake has burst, the process 
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dismantles the end moraine to such an extent that the danger of a subsequent discharge 
is either minimized or eliminated. 
 
Severity is usually the simplest part of the equation. It can be determined in two steps: 
1. Take a worst-case scenario of a lake outburst and determine the surface 
perimeter that would be affected below the source. 
 
2. Compile the statistics for population and property located within the perimeter 
and calculate the value, assuming total loss.  
 
 
2.8 Problems in investigating in Kyrgyzstan. 
In the thesis we estimate the probability as well as the magnitude of potential GLOF 
events. This task is very difficult since the probability of a lake outburst cannot be 
predicted with any reasonable level of certainty. This introduces another dimension of 
the problem, that of perception or what people who live downstream from a glacial lake 
think about the impending threat. This is a considerable problem because, over the past 
twenty years or so, exaggerated reporting in both the news media and the semi-
scientific literature, and widespread reaction to it, have influenced this perception. 
 
Need to analyze and to determine GLOFs have occurred in the recent past, they have 
taken lives and destroyed property, and there is no doubt that such catastrophes will 
occur in the future, if not tomorrow. The difficulty lies in balancing all of these elements 
as well as estimating the costs of any mitigation efforts and/or early warning systems. 
When only limited resources are available, it is important to have a clear perspective of 
costs and benefits. 
 
 
2.9 Risk Management and Strategy in Kyrgyzstan 
Glaciers and glacial lakes in the territory of Kyrgyzstan have been categorised and 
mapped systematically; nevertheless there are prevailing risks. Increased human 
pressure in high mountain areas and growing socioeconomic vulnerability mean that 
GLOF risk management is needed. 
 
Risk management  is defined as “the creation and evaluation of options for initiating or 
changing human activities or (natural and artificial) structures with the objectives of 
increasing the net benefit to human society and preventing harm to humans and what 
they value; and the implementation of chosen options and the monitoring of their 
effectiveness” 
 
In May 2011, in Geneva, Switzerland at the third session of the Global Platform for 
Disaster Risk Reduction, the World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction Ministry of 
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Emergency Situations of the Kyrgyz Republic was announced the establishment of a 
National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
 
The Government of Kyrgyz Republic is develops a "National Platform of Kyrgyz 
republic of disaster risk reduction" with the support of UNDP "Disaster Risk 
Management". This has improved understanding and capacity in hazard assessment 
and mapping of recurring disasters and a component on disaster risk reduction has 
been included in national development plans. The Tenth Five Year Plan (2005-2015) 
incorporated disaster risk reduction and preparedness and mainstreaming of 
components. Kyrgyz Republic has also ratified the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 
2005-2015, adopted at the UN World Conference on Disaster Reduction, Kobe (Japan), 
in 2005. 
 
A qualitative change is visualized in this strategy document based on realization of the 
need to mainstream disaster risk management into development activities and to 
shifting the emphasis from relief to preparedness. The document also proposes an 
organizational set up for a "Interdepartmental Commission for Civil Protection" chaired 
by the Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic for Integrated safety of the population 
and territory of the Kyrgyz Republic in emergency and crisis situations until 2020. In 
addition, a ‘Law on the glaciers of the Kyrgyz Republic’ was drafted and is in the 
process of promulgation. 
 
Other documents related to disaster preparedness and its policies in Kyrgyz Republic 
include the following: 
 National Plan of Action to Combat Desertification in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
http://www.unccd.int/ActionProgrammes/kyrgyzstan-rus2000.pdf  
 
 Water Code of the Kyrgyz Republic  
http://online.adviser.kg/Document/?doc_id=30299858 
 
 National Sustainable Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic for the 
period 2013-2017 years  
http://mes.kg/ru/RNSYr/  
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3. INVESTIGATION OF PETROV’S LAKE 
3.1 Field Investigations 
One of the high priority lakes was subjected to intense field investigation in this thesis. 
The physical conditions, natural and technological risks and the potential 
socioeconomic impacts that would result from a possible lake outburst were 
investigated. This included topographical mapping, hydro meteorological observations, 
and engineering geological, geophysical, and glaciological research. Potential 
downstream impacts were estimated using flood-outburst modelling to show which 
areas would be affected in a worst case situation. This entailed mapping settlements, 
infrastructure, agricultural land and other features of socioeconomic significance 
located within the perimeter of the modelled flood limits. 
 
 
3.2 Petrov’s Glacier Lake 
The Petrov’s lake (3,741 m a.s.l.) is located in the foreground of the Petrov’s glacier 
which is situated on the north-western slope of Ak-Shiirak massive in central 
Kyrgyzstan (Figure 3.1). The Ak-Shiirak massive belongs to short mountain ranges of 
inner Tien Shan that are elevated above wide and shallow valleys formed during the 
Quaternary glaciations. The region is characterized by a highly continental climate with 
marked seasonal variation (Table. 3.1.). In the zone of predominantly west winds, 
precipitation mainly falls in the spring and summer months while the winters are cold 
and dry. Mean January, July and annual temperatures are -11.5, -13.8, and 4.6 , 
respectively, and the mean annual precipitation is 303 mm. According to meteorological 
data from the nearby Tian Shan station (3,614 m a.s.l.), an increase in average annual 
temperature of 0.009  has occurred during 1962–2003. 
 
Figure 3.1 Fluctuations of the Petrov’s glacier terminus since 1957. 
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Petrov’s lake is fed by meltwater from the Petrov’s glacier and small hanging glaciers in 
the rock walls and side valleys. The Petrov’s Glacier is 69.8     in area and 12.3    
long. The terminal moraine complex that dams the lake consists predominantly of 
granitic material situated in the accumulation area of the glacier. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Average monthly temperatures (Tien Shan station, 1962–2013). 
 
The Petrov’s glacier tongue ﬂows from the central part of the Ak-Shiirak ridge and 
forms the eastern shore of the Petrov’s lake. In the beginning of 21 century the terminal 
moraine of the Petrov’s glacier was accumulated at 3,710 m a.s.l. According to data a 
small lake appeared in front of the glacier at that time (materials of State Agency for 
Cartography of Kyrgyz Republic). Subsequent observations by Davidov (1927) indicate 
that the glacier terminus probably reached the morainic plain, between the terminal 
moraine and the western shore of the current Petrov’s lake. Generic outline of the 
glacier position does not, however, enable determination of the exact terminus position. 
 
 
3.2.1 Development of Petrov’s Glacier Lake 
As discussed earlier the main factor of the possibility Glacier Lake outburst failure is the 
possible massive melting of the glacier. With a large glacier melting, a huge volume of 
water entering the lake will increase the load on the moraine dam. 
 
The survey in 1919 revealed a small re-advance of the glacier, driving the glacier 
terminus towards the terminal moraine of the Little Ice Age. During the 1920s and 1930s 
the Petrov’s glacier had undergone a remarkable retreat after which another period of 
advance emerged during 1947–1957. The Petrov’s lake had extended to approximately 
0,85     between 1911 and 1947 which represents a yearly increase in surface area of 
0.015 or 0,018     . Volume of water in this period was equal to 14    . 
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Table 3.1 Petrov’s glaciers and lake on different periods. 
Digitized map Data 
 
Lake 
Area – 0.96     
Annual grown – 11000   
Glacier 
Total retreat – 1.330  (1869-1957) 
Annual retreat – 15.1    
 
Lake 
Area – 1.83     
Annual grown – 37600   
Glacier 
Total retreat – 570  (1957-1980) 
Annual retreat – 24.8    
 
Lake 
Area – 2.34     
Annual grown – 48000   
Glacier 
Total retreat – 380  (1980-1990) 
Annual retreat – 38.0    
 
Lake 
Area – 2.80     
Annual grown – 63000   
Glacier 
Total retreat – 390  (1990-1999) 
Annual retreat – 33.3    
 
Lake 
Area – 3.80     
Annual grown – 92700   
Glacier 
Total retreat – 430  (1999-2006) 
Annual retreat – 61.4    
 
Lake 
Area – 4.40     
Annual grown – 105.500   
Glacier 
Total retreat – 470  (2006-2013) 
Annual retreat – 72.3    
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Since the end of the 1950s till now, the glacier terminus has retreated continuously 
(Figure. 3.1) with an accelerating rate of recession. Table 3.1 presents the average values 
for linear retreat of the glacier terminus. Between 1957 and 1980 the surface of the lake 
increased considerably. It expanded 1.9 times, i.e. a yearly increase of the lake surface 
area by 0.037    . The expansion of the surface has persisted. Between 1980 and 1995 
the lake grew approximately 0.063     every year to reach a size of 2.78    . The 
increase in volume was directly related to the decline of the glacier front during this 
same period. The increase of the lake surface correlates with an increase in volume of 
the lake basin. 
 
On the basis of depth measurements in 1978 and 1995, bathymetric maps of the lake 
were drawn. They show that the lake basin contains two longitudinal depressions 
separated by shallow water back and four islands. The morphometry of the basin is 
related to the shaping affects of the Petrov’s glacier which is made up of two main 
glacier bodies separated by the middle moraine which continues on the bottom of the 
lake basin. The deepest parts of the lake are found in front of the Petrov’s glacier 
terminus. 
Table 3.2 Rising of the lake area. 
Year Area (   ) Annual grown(  ) 
1911 0,2-0,3 0 
1947 0,80 15.000-18.000 
1957 0,96 11.000 
1980 1,83 37.600 
1995 2,78 63.000 
2006 3,80 92.700 
2013 4,40 105.500 
 
In 2006 the Petrov’s glacier terminus was 1.5 km wide and more than half of it (800 m) 
was immersed in the lake water. As a result of the hydrostatic forces and oscillation of 
the water level in the lake there is intensive calving of the glacier terminus which rises 
up to 25 m. The falling of broken ice into the lake causes waves with the amplitude of 
up to 2 m, although higher waves cannot be excluded. The accelerating decay of the 
glacier terminus reﬂects the generally negative mass balance of glaciers in the Ak-
Shiirak. 
 
In 2013 area of water was 4.40     and annual grown was 105,500  . The volume of 
water is near to the limit mark. 
 
Experience shows that if the volume of the lake will continue to grow at such a pace 
that in the near future there will be a lake outburst (Table 3.2). 
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3.2.2 Bathymetric investigation.   
The first bathymetric investigation of Petrov’s lake was conducted by Kumtor operating 
company in 1994. 
 
The field investigations showed that by 2012 the lake area had increased to 4.40     
and the storage capacity to 105.87    ; the maximum depth obtained was 69.3 m. The 
bathymetric and topographic maps from the field survey are shown in Figure 3.2. The 
lake area continues to increase, but with a reduction in the rate of growth since 1957. 
The level differences between the benchmarks on the lateral moraines are becoming 
less, although not uniformly, indicating irregular settling of the surface of the moraine 
dam over the last seven to eight years. 
 
The contemporary expansion of Petrov’s lake is primarily towards the north as the 
relatively warm lake water melts back into the glacier and accentuates the collapse of 
blocks of ice from the cliffs that form its terminus.  The southern margin of the lake 
close to the end moraine has also expanded, although the position of the outlet has 
remained more or less unchanged. 
 
 
3.2.3 Hydrometeorology 
The nearest hydrometeorological station "Tian-Shan", to Petrov’s Lake is located  about 
20 km to the west and  100 m lower in elevation. The station was established in 1962 by 
the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology (DHM), Government of Kyrgyzstan. 
Hydrometeorological data were semi-automatically recorded until now and manually 
thereafter. Experimental measurements showed that the lake discharged at a rate of 2.9  
     during the month of May with little diurnal variation. A seasonal maximum 
discharge of 3.7      was observed between June and September and a seasonal 
minimum of 1.1       between December and February. The discharge increased 
gradually from April to August and decreased from September until the onset of the 
winter season. 
 
Meteorological data were obtained from the "Tian-Shan" station for the period from 
1962 to 2013 (Figure 3.1). The average annual mean temperature for this period was 
4.6°C; with an average annual increase of 0.009°C. August is the month with highest 
rainfall followed by July. The average precipitation in the area during the monsoon 
period (June - September) is 303 mm and during the dry season (December - February) 
13.1 mm. Maximum primary and secondary solar radiation of 267     and 265     
were recorded during July and May respectively. 
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3.2.4 Geophysical investigations 
The geophysical investigations showed the existence of dead-ice blocks within the end 
moraine, together with multiple thermokarst features. In places the ice was visible at 
the surface. The presence of slowly melting blocks of ice has been corroborated by 
results of researching which demonstrated the presence of dead ice masses of different 
sizes in the end moraine. Researchers of "Kumtor" company (2010) came to a similar 
conclusion based on geotechnical surveys. Limited radarogram analysis based on a 
ground penetrating radar survey along the shoreline of Petrov’s glacier lake showed 
that the moraine contains patches of unconsolidated materials made up of big boulders 
that create large voids. 
 
The Petrov’s lake is enclosed by the terminal moraine and the lateral moraines at the 
foot of the valley slopes. These form the shore line all the way to the current terminal 
moraine. While the lateral moraines are of no serious danger to the lake, the eastern and 
western shores are under continual development. The glacier dam on the western side 
of the lake is affected by the most destructive processes. It is exposed to lake level 
oscillations and to degradation processes in the moraine area. Among the potentially 
hazardous processes inﬂuencing the moraine dam through the changes of lake level are 
the glacier melting and calving. The estimated volumes of largest observed ice break-off 
exceed 500,000  . Other processes such as rock or ice avalanches from adjacent rock 
walls and hanging glaciers could be excluded from the assessment of potential risk to 
the glacier dam, due to the snow and ice masses being too remote from the lake. 
Therefore, the hazard assessment concentrates on the Petrov’s glacier and lake behavior 
and moraine dam properties. 
 
   
 
Figure 3.3 Longitudinal proﬁle of the Petrov’s Lake. 
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The deciding factor for the moraine dam development is the presence of buried ice 
which is the cause of the instability and transient lifetime of the current dam. Forming 
the major part of the overall moraine content, ice protrudes in many places of the 
sedimentary cover and represents the most dynamic part of the dam. The degradation 
of the dead ice is accompanied by relief sinking, thermokarst lakes emerging, morainic 
sediment sliding and down-slope falling. Major changes to the sedimentary cover of the 
dam are caused by the effect of intensive glacial processes. Many active glacial 
landforms are developed in the dam. 
 
 
3.2.5 Glacier observations 
Petrov’s Lake has a wide end moraine in which there is a possibility of piping 
developing (formation of water channels inside the moraine due to seepage, and 
leading to instability). This needs to be investigated. Seepage was detected at the toe of 
the outer wall of the moraine dam. Follow up investigations will be needed to identify 
the source of the seepage which could be the melting of dead ice or from local drainage. 
Regular monitoring will also be needed as discharge and debris from side valleys drop 
into the lake. 
Temporary blockage of the lake outlet over the moraines by freezing water and snow 
barriers, or lake ice debris is very unlikely because the lake outlet has a wide artificial 
channel through the moraine dam that functions as a spillway. During the field 
investigation, the team noted that the gated artificial outlet channel was functioning 
satisfactorily, but they also noted vibrations in the anchor blocks as well as subsidence 
in the gabion walls. These two features should be monitored regularly. 
 
Monitoring of the hanging glaciers and the likelihood of them breaking off is one of the 
major practical challenges in the hazard assessment of Petrov’s lake. They are clearly 
visible as they have a limited area.  Climatic data should be recorded and monitored 
regularly in the lake area, particularly extreme climatic events and their impacts. 
 
 
3.2.6 Stability of the moraine dam. 
The elevation of Petrov’s Lake is almost 10 m higher than 50 years ago, which is 
significant in terms of climate regime. The huge water mass seems hanging over the 
tailings but it is separated by two barriers (Figure. 2). The each barrier is a final-moraine 
dam. The first of them is lake which was formed for the last thousand years, at late 
Holocene age. The second lower bank is more ancient. It was formed 15-20 thousand 
years ago, in upper Pleistocene age.  However, the lakeside bank is holding 105 
          of the Lake Petrov’s water from discharge down the valley. It is also 
supposed that the lower bank would hold the outburst flow in case of the Petrov’s Lake 
outburst and would diverse the water mass of the breached lake from the tailings 
facilities currently containing 100         of wastes with cyanide and continues that 
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if “the outburst flow is significant (up to several thousands of m³/sec), its power will be 
enough for washing out of the second barrier and destruction of tailings dump. 
 
3.2.7 Lake growth. 
The physical characteristics of the lake as identified during the field surveys of 2013 are 
summarized in Table 3.2. 
 
The development of lake began at about the same time through amalgamation of small 
ponds. The more rapid initial growth of Petrov’s lake resulted in it becoming one the 
largest moraine-dammed lake in Kyrgyzstan. The lake is moraine-dammed and in 
contact with their associated glacier, and have thus mainly expanded towards their 
glacier terminus in parallel with glacial retreat and calving. Over the last decade, the 
expansion of Petrov’s Lake has been maximal and the glacier terminus is retreating. Its 
southern section close to the end moraine is widening. 
 
The volume of lake is increasing by an average of 0.26 million cubic metres per year. 
The water depth of lake increases toward the glacier termini, but here the lateral 
moraines are 50-100 m in height and either in contact with bedrock or with debris or 
talus cover. Thus, the lateral hydrostatic pressure exerted by the greater depths are 
more or less counterbalanced by the lateral moraines, and the expansion of the lakes has 
not added any extra lateral pressure to the relatively weak moraine at the outlets. 
 
3.3 Possibility of Petrov’s Glacier Lake outburst flood (GLOF). 
Intensive development of thermokarst processes, state and structure of the moraine 
dam is extremely variability, causing the possibility of an outburst of Petrov’s Lake. 
Petrov’s Lake breakthrough can occur both surface and underground way. Surface lake 
breakthrough possible by deepening existing closure channel in the body of the dam 
through which the Kumtor river flows out of the lake.  
 
 
Figure 3.4 Modeling of glacial lake outburst flood at Petrov’s Lake. 
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In 1998, was modeled scenario at the lake surface breakthrough on existing Kumtor 
riverbed for the case with the maximum flood flow outburst up to 400     . 
Assessment of the affected area, adjacent to the mine lake Petrov’s showed outburst 
flow will be large. It will concentrate along the river Kumtor expanding (up to 260 m) in 
some areas expanding and narrowing the narrow valley bottom areas. The calculation 
of flooding showed that a GLOF could threaten the flow of the Kumtor mine tailings. 
 
Tailings pond of “Kumtor” gold mining company. “Kumtor” Tailings Managements Facility 
(TMF) is a complex of special hydraulic structures and equipment designed to contain 
wastes from processed mineral resources called tailings. The Tailings Management 
Facility of the Kumtor mine is located in the Arabel River Valley 6.7 km from the gold 
mill. TMF contains is crushed rock with chemical admixtures formed as a result of a 
gold recovery process. Gold recovery at Kumtor averaging 80%, the TMF contains, 
according to preliminary estimates, approximately 65 tonnes of gold. Thus, with proper 
technology available, reprocessing of tailings is possible for gold recovery purposes.  
(Figure 3.5). 
 
The dam is 3,000 meters long and 34 meters high. The dam is of trapezoidal cross-
section while the dam crest is 10 meters wide. A 100-meters synthetic antifiltration liner 
was placed on the upstream side of the dam to prevent erosion, seepage and freezing of 
dam body. 
 
Local and foreign experts have jointly developed methods and technology of dam 
buildup, according to which a local design organization in Kyrgyzstan has developed a 
special dam buildup project. At present, the dam has an elevation of 3,664 meters above 
sea level. In 2016, the dam will be raised to its final elevation of 3,670.5 meters, thus 
enabling the TMF to contain 87.7 million cubic meters of tailings. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Tailings pond of “Kumtor” gold mining company. 
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3.3.1 Glacier Lake outburst failure triggers. 
 
Hydrometeorological factors such as air temperature, humidity, radiation, wind speed, 
wind direction, and precipitation influence glacial melt, discharge into the lakes, and 
melting of buried ice. The lake has an effective discharge capacity, hence there has been 
no significant rise in water levels. Undercutting of moraine slopes is not a substantial 
threat. 
 
Extreme events such as heavy snowfall or very high temperatures could destabilise the 
lakes. Earthquakes could also affect moraine and lake stability, however assessment of 
the potential danger of glacial lake outburst as induced by earthquake tremor is most 
likely beyond current competence. 
 
The erosion areas of the glaciers were covered by debris derived mainly from the slopes 
above. The Petrov’s glacier has several transverse crevasses and collapse features; they 
are caving into the lakes, although the collapsing masses of ice are not large enough to 
generate dangerous displacement waves. Also in this case of Petrov’s glacier should be 
monitored for signs of instability as they could potentially produce ice blocks. 
 
 
3.3.2 Potential GLOF hazards. 
Petrov’s lake’s storage volume of 105 million cubic meters, dam height of 45 m, lowest 
freeboard, and narrow dam cushion, means there is more likelihood of a GLOF 
occurrence. The lake needs to be monitored for seepages which can cause moraine dam 
failure by piping/undermining. Similarly, other key features including 
hydrometeorological conditions such as lake water level, excessive drainage, or extreme 
climatic conditions, and dam conditions terminal moraines and moraine dam crest 
height and width should also be monitored. 
 
There is a further need to assess the influence of the surroundings, for example the 
impacts of hanging glaciers; debris flows/slides; and the condition of associated 
glaciers that may generate calving on a scale sufficient to cause a large surge wave. 
Variation amongst all of these features may influence GLOF hazard levels. Tectonic 
activity or earthquake induced GLOF hazard is a possibility that should be considered, 
although prediction is beyond the current competence. 
 
They also talked about possible flood of tailings pond. If the volume of water actually 
destroys part of the tailings dam, it can be a disaster in the region. Because, 
contaminated water gets into the largest river in Central Asia. Naryn river basin fully 
comes to unsuitability. Water pollution affects the soil which 70% of the population 
uses. Unsuitability of the water affects will regionally.  
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Overall the findings indicate that the immediate risk of a GLOF occurring is much 
lower than had been postulated for lake; but many factors cannot be assessed and 
catastrophic changes cannot be predicted. Thus there is an urgent need for more 
information as well as for regular monitoring and early warning systems. 
 
 
3.4 Possible consequences of the Petrov’s (GLOF). 
The Outburst moraine-glacial lakes - one of the most devastating natural disasters in 
high mountain areas, because their result can be disruptive floods and mudslides that 
extend for tens of kilometers down the valleys, destroying infrastructure and taking 
away human life. As noted above, this is the most dangerous - a outburst of  lake, under 
the moraine channel (tunnel) at the dam of the outburst site, which may be 
accompanied by the transformation of hydrodynamic outburst wave to stone 
devastating mudslide. Bathymetric survey calculations show that the maximum volume 
of the outburst may reach 39-40 million  .  
 
Petrov’s GLOF events have downstream impacts at four different levels: individual 
household, village, district, and national. At the household level, impacts are either 
direct (from inundation) or secondary (e.g., from erosion or landslides). At the village 
level, people are affected by a loss of natural resources and service infrastructure. At the 
district level, damage to physical infrastructure disrupts the flow of goods and services, 
and at national level power supplies are disrupted because of damage to 
hydroelectricity projects, affecting populations living far beyond the GLOF area. 
The moraine dam failure of such a scenario for the Petrov’s Lake may result in the 
following consequences: 
 
 
3.4.1 Economic consequences. 
 
The impact of a GLOF event downstream is quite extensive in terms of damage to 
roads, bridges, trekking trials, villages, and agricultural lands as well as the loss of other 
infrastructures. In the territory of Kumtor valley have a lot of industrial objects. One of 
main is Kumtor Gold Mine Company.   
 
Kumtor Gold mine company is an open-pit gold mining site in Kyrgyzstan located in 
the Kumtor valley about 1.5-2 km northwest  of the  Petrov’s glacier lake 350 km (220 
mi) southeast of the capital Bishkek and 80 km (50 mi) south of Lake Issyk-Kul. Located 
in Tian Shan mountains at more than 4,000 m (14,000 ft) above sea level, Kumtor is the 
second-highest gold mining operation in the world after Yanacocha gold mine in Peru.  
 
The camp of the Kumtor mine complex (main camp, administration and maintenance 
facilities) is sited in such a vulnerable location (Figure 3.4), downstream of the Petrov’s 
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glacier lake that the possible water movement toward the camp will present an essential 
risk, presenting risks throughout the operating life. Huge financial costs that were 
invested for infrastructure are threatened. If we assume that the data from the 
company's website the total amount spent on the creation of the camp is over 50 million 
dollars. 
 
In addition there is also the risk of flooding civilian objects on the road flooding. As 
mentioned above, bridges, roads, villages will be under threat of flooding. This will 
result in a huge financial cost which will affect the country's economy.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Location schemes of hydroelectric stations. 
 
Constructors of hydropower plants on the Naryn River also concerned about the 
situation on the Petrov’s Lake. Because the shock wave of flood can cause damage to 
constructions. However, if we bear in mind that Akbulun hydroelectric dam located at a 
distance of over 150 kilometers from Petrov’s lake, the risk of failure is unlikely (Figure 
3.6.). 
 
 
3.4.2 Environmental consequences. 
Kumtor gold company inability to prevent the Petrov’s glacier melting into the lake 
leaves little hope that outburst flows can be controlled. Though Kumtor gold company 
has been making an extensive effort to address, the problems are likely to continue long 
time unless and until a mechanism is designed and installed to address them in revised 
operating plans that remove the tailings from the Lake Petrov’s outflow path or other 
design sufficient to prevent or eliminate the glacial flow risks that current affect 
operations.  
 
Should take into account that now the tailings dam is unstable, because it was built on 
the grounds, which began to melt during the filling bowl tailings. On the basis of 
geotechnical monitoring since April 1999 has been fixed movement dam to the south-
east side. Stabilization of the dam has become a big problem for the company. In 2006, 
was begin a project to build an extended wedge in the lower slope of the dam. The 
result has been to reduce the rate of displacement of the dam from 3.6 - 6.6         
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to 0.9          Final conclusion about the effectiveness of the decision experts can 
give after some time, because there are concerns that the rate of displacement of the 
dam will continue. 
 
In the case of the destruction of the eastern side of the dam by mudflow, this may occur 
after the Petrov’s Lake outburst is not excluded that cyanide-containing waste gets into 
the river basins of the Kumtor-Naryn. It will be transformation of hydrodynamic 
outburst of the lake to ecological catastrophe on a regional scale. Likelihood of this 
scenario increases significantly, because the water level in the lake increases too.  
 
If the waste from the tailings pond gets into the Naryn River, one of the key water 
sources of Central Asia will become worthless. Will harmed not only to water source, 
but also all of vegetation and after animal world of the Naryn river basin. Catastrophe 
can bring huge environmental and economic losses. 
 
 
3.4.3 Human life loss consequences. 
The analysis takes into account the risk of loss of human lives, too. Because the 
possibility risk of outburst flood the huge volume of water is very high. And it is 
impossible to guess the events that may carry human life, but still we need to consider 
the consequences with maximum casualties.  
 
If we will take into account the scenario of a lake outburst flood with the volume  >40 
million m3 flow outburst wave, then under threat of flooding can be more than several 
villages, camp of Kumtor gold mine (more than 150), also workers on the power plants. 
Since the settlements are at a distance of 150 km, the possibility of evacuation great. 
Under threat are the employees of gold-mining company, who are located at a distance 
of 1 km from the lake. 
 
The vulnerability of people living downstream from the three lakes differs in relation to 
the livelihoods and infrastructure characteristics of each area. Overall, the risk may 
change with passage of time and may also increase in the context of current 
atmospheric warming. In national terms, other lakes must also be considered. It is 
essential to develop an appropriate strategy and policy as well as short- and long-term 
action plans for Petrov’s GLOF risk management. The findings of the current study 
serve as a resource guide and provide materials for assessing GLOF hazards, 
socioeconomic vulnerability, and GLOF impacts downstream in Kyrgyzstan. It is hoped 
that the findings will be useful in designing GLOF risk management and reduction 
strategies in Kyrgyzstan, as well as throughout the Tian Shan region. 
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3.5 Monitoring, Early Warning and Mitigation. 
Risk results from a combination of the actual hazard and the vulnerability of people and 
their environment. Thus a risk can be minimized by lowering the level of hazard as well 
as by reducing vulnerability. Mitigation is the word used to describe actions to reduce 
the hazard and risk level. 
 
Mitigation measures can be structural and non-structural. Measures include monitoring 
to provide an early indication of changes, early warning systems (EWS) to provide 
downstream residents and owners of infrastructure time to take avoidance action, and 
mitigation measures to physically change the situation and reduce the hazard and risk. 
 
Kyrgyzstan hasn't made considerable progress in GLOF risk knowledge, risk 
assessment, mitigation and early warning. But, several government structures (Ministry 
of Emergency Situations and Central Asian Institute of Applied GeoScience) holds 
monitoring of Lake in every year. Structural mitigation activities for GLOF risk 
reduction weren't carried out for Petrov’s Glacier lake, because such measures are very 
expensive and it is unlikely that this approach could be utilised in the case of all glacial 
lakes in Kyrgyzstan that have been identified as potentially posing a risk of a GLOF. 
 
 
3.5.1 Monitoring. 
Monitoring GLOF hazard levels requires a multi-staged, interdisciplinary approach 
using multi-temporal data sets. Key indicators include changes in the lakes and their 
impoundments which should be observed using different data sets at varying time 
scales to evaluate glacier hazard and stability of moraine dams. A considerable amount 
of information can be derived using remote sensing approaches to identify changes in 
lake size. Monitoring of critical lakes may require direct periodic observation. To be 
effective, this should be carried out in cooperation with all stakeholders: communities, 
government departments, institutions, agencies, and broadcasting media, and others. 
 
 
3.5.2 Early Warning. 
At this time, the government is considering a project to provide early warning for 
dangerous lakes. 
Early warning is defined as: “The provision of timely and effective information, 
through identified institutions, that allows individuals exposed to a hazard to take 
action to avoid or reduce their risk and prepare for effective response”. For an early 
warning system to be effective, it must integrate four elements: knowledge of the risk, a 
monitoring and warning service, dissemination and communication, and response 
capability. 
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Early warning systems need to be technically sound, simple to operate, easy to maintain 
or replace, and reliable so that accurate and timely warning can be given. The human 
communication networks must be capable of relaying the warning to the appropriate 
authorities. Maximum effectiveness would most likely be achieved if the warning 
systems are placed in the hands of the local communities. 
 
 
3.5.3 Mitigation. 
There are several possible methods for mitigating the impact of GLOFs. The most 
important mitigation measure is to reduce the volume of water in the lake, thus 
reducing the magnitude of the possible peak discharge at the time of breach. Structural 
mitigation measures can also be applied downstream to protect infrastructure from 
peak floods. 
 
The volume of water can be reduced by means of one or more of the following: 
controlled breaching of the moraine dam; construction of an outlet control structure; 
pumping or siphoning the water from the lake; and tunnelling through the moraine 
barrier or under an ice dam. 
 
Preventative measures can also be carried out around the lake and also tailings pond to 
secure against potential threats such as loose rocks or snow/ice avalanches that could 
trigger displacement waves. 
 
Infrastructure downstream (diversion weirs, intakes, bridges, or river bank settlements) 
can be protected against a possible surge through proper construction that allows 
sufficient space for the flow of water and avoids damming. Bridges should have 
appropriate flow capacities at elevations higher than expected GLOF levels and the 
spans of piers should not be obstructed by uprooted tree trunks. Land use zoning 
should also be considered as an effective approach to mitigation by reducing the 
structures and elements at risk. Among others, settlements should not be built on or 
near low river terraces within the GLOF hazard zones. River banks with potential or old 
landslides and scree slopes near settlements should be stabilised and appropriate 
warning devices installed. 
 
 
3.5.6 Awareness Raising. 
 
Besides monitoring lakes, it is essential to raise local awareness, and increase 
knowledge about how to respond. Community and local government bodies should 
focus on monitoring the lakes, mitigating their vulnerability to GLOF, and preparing to 
cope with such events should they occur: early warning begins with disaster 
preparedness. This involves raising awareness about glacial lakes, their characteristics, 
level of hazards, and the required responses during and after GLOF events. 
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4. RISK ASSESSMENT. 
4.1 Preliminary analysis and scope of the study. 
The first problem is the geotechnical issues relating to the Petrov’s glacial lake. Also, I 
have grouped several aspects of impact to gold mine infrastructure. These following 
aspects: 
 
 Risk of possible failure of the Lake Petrov’s natural moraine dam – and resulting 
Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF) and its catastrophic impact to tailings pond 
and contamination of water of Central Asia. 
 
This is an analysis that includes: identification of an initiating event, the factors that 
determine the initiator to reach potential accident scenarios, the consequences and 
damage that may occur in the case where the accident sequence is given. 
 
Detailed GLOF hazard and risk assessment is undertaken by simulating GLOF 
scenarios. Numerical hydrological modeling of the Petrov’s glacial lake was carried out 
using data from the field investigations and from secondary data sources. 
 
For risk assessment used three possible initiators have been considered: 
 
1. Increase in water level in the lake, which leads to the destruction of the moraine 
dam; 
2. The great earthquake that will lead to several possible consequences: 
 Destruction of the moraine dam; 
 The emergence of large water waves on the surface of the lake; 
 Tailings dam destruction (Parallel destruction of the moraine dam and 
tailings dam is also possible); 
3. Erosion or displacement of the moraine dam. 
 
For each initiator was used individual solutions that have enabled the high quality 
analysis. 
 
 
4.1.1 Modeling Objective and Approach. 
 
The main objective of GLOF modeling was to simulate moraine dam failure of the high 
priority lakes and assess potential GLOF impacts downstream. The specific objectives 
were: 
 to develop a glacial lake breach model;  
 to develop a model of flood propagation in the valley downstream; 
4. RISK ASSESSMENT  
 
45 
 
 to forecast flood velocity of flow;  
 to assess downstream GLOF impact. 
 
The study was in three stages:  
 modelling outbursts;  
 modelling flood propagation downstream and flood mapping;  
 downstream GLOF impact assessment. 
 
 
4.1.2 Sources of data. 
 
A Event tree modelling by Reability Workbranch of approach was applied for GLOF 
simulation and vulnerability assessment. Topographic information about the study area 
determines the accuracy and reliability of the model. Topographic information about 
the study area determines the accuracy and reliability of the model. Spatial data such as 
a digital elevation model (DEM) of the study area,  inline structures of rivers, land 
use/cover, settlements, infrastructure, and administrative boundaries were derived 
from the topographic maps of Kyrgyzstan prepared by the Department of Cartography 
of Kyrgyzstan, and satellite image of SRTM and LANDSAT. 
 
The 2009 field survey provided data about the lakes including the surface area, 
maximum depth, and top and bottom elevations, and information about moraine dams 
including the inside/outside slope, dam length and width, unit weight of dam material, 
porosity, diameter of particles, and internal friction angle. 
 
A digital elevation model (DEM) of the study area was prepared; the Arc GIS modelling 
package was used to fill sinks and generate rivers for input into cross sections. 
 
The computer applications used for modelling watershed boundaries, river flow, and 
basin and river properties included ArcGIS/ArcView,  was used to acquire geometric 
data sets from the digital terrain model; and ArcScene/ArcView were used for GLOF 
modelling. 
 
 
4.2 Methodology of analysis. 
 
In this section the methodology was carried out to analyze the economic, environmental 
and human life loss risk in the potential outburst flood area; which covers the steps of 
identifying accidents, modeling and risk quantification. 
 
There  are  various  methods  of  identifying  potential  hazards,  monitoring  their 
development and estimating  the probable magnitude of such event. Usage of particular 
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methods and their combinations change over time with future bringing new 
possibilities and technologies. Comprehensive procedures for making assessment of 
potential glacial hazards have been developed focusing on a certain high-mountain 
region. 
 
 
4.2.1 Remote sensing. 
 
Remote  sensing  proved  to  be  very helpful  in  identifying  potential  hazards 
especially  in  areas  poorly accessible  for  physical  or  political  reasons.  Contactless 
monitoring of such places in high mountains may be carried out more frequently than 
terrain research which is often more expensive. There are two types of remote sensing: 
air-borne and space-borne. 
 
Remote sensing suggests selecting the most appropriate data source depending on the 
temporal, spectral and spatial characteristics of the observed hazard. Temporal 
resolution of imagery is the minimum time between two consecutive scanning of the 
same place on Earth. It relates to the rate at which a certain hazard develops. For 
example,  glacier  surges  may develop  during  few  days  or  weeks  and  therefore 
require regular and frequent monitoring, whereas formation of a glacial lake takes years 
or decades so yearly observations are sufficient. For long-term monitored hazards the 
length of data archive is very important as the tendency and future development may 
be estimated. 
 
 
4.2.1.1 Space-borne remote sensing. 
 
Satellite sensors may yield information independently of the  political, topographic or 
financial restrictions. Data of  medium resolution cover up to tens of thousands square 
kilometers by one scene and are becoming well accessible, cheap (few          or 
much less) and a repeated cycle of few days is often possible. Satellite imagery of high 
mountain  regions  began to be archived in 20 the 1980´s so the longest periods of 
acquisition are almost three decades, which  is important in monitoring long-term 
changes within glacier areas. SRTM (Shuttle Radar Topography Mission) has a long 
period of acquisition, its spatial resolution of 90 m predestinate it solely for usage in 
first-order assessments. There are also optical sensors of medium spatial resolution such 
as Landsat TM (Thematic-Mapper). These have spatial  resolution  in  the range of  28  
m  which  makes  them  suitable  for examination of surface morphology, e.g. glacier 
lakes, moraine  dam. 
 
All of these satellite images with medium resolution are free for using them for 
noncommercial purposes. 
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SRTM image LANDSAT 7 Image Digitized map 
   
Figure 4.1 Digitizing of map on the Arc GIS software. 
 
4.2.1.2 Air-borne remote sensing. 
 
Aerial photography has longer tradition than space imagery so the archives offer 
successions convenient for comparison and trend-monitoring of glaciers or lake 
formation. Spatial resolution is very high but one scene covers usually few or few tens 
of square kilometers, which is incomparable to satellite sensors. Processing of the 
photographs allow relatively accurate mapping of  high  mountain terrain within visible 
to near infrared (V-NIR) spectral region. But as you know, for the quality you have to 
pay. Aerial photographs are very expensive for some works. And so it remains to use 
satellite images. 
 
 
4.2.1.3 Application on glacial hazard assessment. 
 
Remote sensing is used in glacierized regions for monitoring of horizontal and vertical 
displacements as they often signify a potential hazard development. Basic parameters 
used for remote sensing identification of potential hazards are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Risk for breaching of a moraine dam can be evaluated by remote sensing in contrast to 
glacier outbursts from englacial or subglacial drainage systems. Moraine-dammed lakes 
are easily detectable, time series are particularly useful for assessing dynamics and 
estimating of future development. Recognition of moraine dam characteristics (dam 
geometry, deformation, settlement, surface material) requires high-resolution and high-
precision techniques. Monitoring of associated glacier (its geometry, surface type, 
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thickness changes, velocity etc.) is also important as it may help assessing of the glacial 
lakes evolution. 
Glacier  surges  as  well  as  stable  advance  or  retreat  can  be  tracked  by  high-
frequency remote  sensing; mass  changes  from  repeat DEM.  Surge-type glaciers can 
often be recognized from deformed, “looped” moraines.  Possible source areas of ice 
avalanches are searched depending on occurrence of steep glaciers through 
combination of spectral data with DEM. Also  areas of potential debris  flows  that may  
accompany glacier  floods  or  lake  outbursts  can  be  detected  by remote  sensing. 
With sufficient spatial resolution it’s possible to estimate the availability of loose debris 
in a potential flood path and its slope. 
 
Table 4.1 Basic parameters used for remote sensing identification of potential hazards. 
 Glacier lake floods Debris flows Ice avalanches 
Surface 
characteristics 
lakes on/ at the margins of a  
 
glacier expanding lake area 
 
steep moraine-dammed 
lakes 
debris accumulations 
occurring within 
(recent) glacial zones 
steep glacial ice 
Critical slope 
gradient 
sediment entrainment and  
 
hyperconcentration: 10° 
flow initiation: 25-38° temperate ice: 25° 
cold ice: 45° 
Maximum 
probable runout. 
clear water flood:                                
may exceed 200 km and  
attain angle of reach < 3° 
 
GLOF triggered debris flow:          
angle of reach 11° 
angle of reach 11° angle of reach 17° 
 
 
4.2.2 Terrain research. 
 
All of described methods were used during a terrain research of Petrov’s Lake and its 
moraine dam. Hydrological methods  include  bathymetric measurements realized with 
the aid of rubber dinghy and an echo-sounder with the accuracy for depths up  to  50  m  
ranging  from  10  to  30  cm  (Figure  3.3).  These  measurements  were systematically 
carried  out  on  the  lake  and  served  to  determination  of  the  changes in depth and 
volume which have taken place during the past few years. 
 
Next, physical and chemical parameters of lake water quality (temperature, dissolved 
oxygen, oxygen saturation, conductivity, salinity or pH) were measured down the 
vertical profiles. Hydrological measurements of all inflows and outflows should be 
done to calculate the lake water balance and fluctuations of water level. 
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Climatic data, especially  temperature and precipitation  trends during  the  year,  is 
also very important to monitor  as  the  highest  temperatures  (and  therefore  ice/  
snow melting)  often  occur together with increased rainfall which may raise lake water 
level and trigger its outburst (Figure 3.1). Meteorological stations installed in high 
mountain areas are often automated and send data in regular intervals directly to the 
researchers. 
 
Geophysical methods include exploration of a dam structure, especially near the lake 
outflow as erosional processes may threaten the dam stability. Changes in morphology 
of the moraine dam should be monitored and compared with last investigation. If a 
glacier terminus is close to the lake, a survey of its margin is necessary, together with 
examination of crevasses and a rate of calving. Areas of subsidence are often closely 
monitored as they may be resulting from thermokarst processes and the dam may be 
destabilized. 
 
An accurate demarcation of a lake shoreline and glacier snout can be carried out either 
with total geodetic station or with GPS measurements. 
 
 
4.2.3 Procedures of hazard assessment. 
 
Different procedures of hazard assessment are applied for different high mountain 
areas around the world as the local conditions may vary significantly. Assessment 
procedures are mostly based on gained experience and historical cases within a certain 
region. The next chapter presented one of methodology for first-order assessment of 
glacial lake outburst hazard, which was compiled by R. J. McKillop and J. J. Clague and 
it concentrates on moraine-dammed lakes. 
 
After identifying the possible lake outburst, each scenario is evaluated in detail. 
Triggering event is a physical fact that has specific causes analysis and can generate an 
incident or accident, depending on the evolution in space-time. Having a list of initial 
events, we continued to identify the parts of the system for each case. This table is 
called "Failure Modes and Effect Analysis".  
 
 
4.2.3.1 Identification of accidents/initiators. 
 
Nowadays, most of organizations are interested to design and develop contingency 
plans for GLOF scenarios. State organizations are among most critical ones to make 
reasonable decisions about develop such plans that identify most probable risks, their 
modes and effects as well as determine appropriate techniques and models as tools for 
assessing GLOF risks and prioritize them and design and develop practical and rigor 
contingency plans to response better during disasters and aftermath. One of most 
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important techniques as "Failure Modes and Effects Analysis" (FMEA) and special 
version of it for organizations "Failure Modes and Effects Analysis" (FMEA) tries to 
help managers and planners of this sector to be good practitioners in this field.  
 
"Failure Modes and Effects Analysis" (FMEA) is an inductive analytical method which 
may be performed at either the functional or piece-part level. "Failure Modes and 
Effects Critically Analysis" (FMECA) extends (FMEA) by including a criticality analysis, 
which is used to chart the probability of failure modes against the severity of their 
consequences. The result highlights failure modes with relatively high probability and 
severity of consequences, allowing remedial effort to be directed where it will produce 
the greatest value: FMECA=FMEA+C 
 
The basic steps for performing a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) include: 
 Familiarization with the system, their equipment and functions; 
 Selection of equipment and their function; 
 Identification of failure modes applicable for the function;  
 Study of the effect of each failure;  
 Study of the causes of failure;  
 Study of existing measures to control the fault and compensation measures;  
 
Results from the Systems FMEA are documented in an FMEA Table that includes the 
following information. 
 Equipment/Function: It is the system where characterized with failure 
probability. 
 Failure mode: The specific manner or way by which a failure occurs in terms of 
failure of the item (being a part or (sub) system) function under investigation; it 
may generally describe the way the failure occurs. It shall at least clearly describe 
a (end) failure state of the item (or function in case of a Functional FMEA) under 
consideration. It is the result of the failure mechanism (cause of the failure 
mode). 
 Failure effect: Immediate consequences of a failure on operation, function or 
functionality, or status of some item. 
 Failure cause and/or mechanism: Defects in requirements, design, process, 
quality control, handling or part applications, which are the underlying cause or 
sequence of causes that initiate a process (mechanism) that leads to a failure 
mode over a certain time. A failure mode may have more causes. 
 Detection or Current Process Controls: The means of detection of the failure 
mode by maintainer, operator or built in detection system, including estimated 
dormancy period (if applicable). 
 Compensatory measure: It is form of policy, method and mechanism which used 
when the accident occur. 
 Remarks / mitigation / actions: Additional info, including the proposed 
mitigation or actions used to lower a risk or justify a risk level or scenario. 
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A schematic of the FMEA Table format used, with an example for one failure scenario, 
is presented in Table 4.2 below. 
 
Table 4.2 FMEA Table Format 
Function Failure 
Mode 
Potential 
Effects of 
Failure 
Failure 
Mechanisms 
Current 
Process 
Controls 
Compensatory 
measure 
Recommended 
Action(s) 
Glacial lake 
Glaciers Melting 
glaciers. 
Rising 
water 
levels. 
Glacial 
Lake, 
Moraine 
dam, 
Possibility 
effect to 
tailings 
pond, 
Ground, 
Vegetation 
cover, 
The rapid 
melting of 
glaciers, will 
raise the water 
level in the 
lake. 
Geotechnical 
control, 
Topographic 
control of 
moraine 
dam, 
topographic 
grid, 
deformation 
and ground 
movement. 
Find an 
alternative 
approach to 
artificial water 
removal. 
Artificial lowering 
of the water on 
the lake. 
Construction of 
drainage system. 
Premature slow 
destruction of the 
moraine dam. 
 
As shown, the above table documents a description of the failure scenario including 
existing safeguards, an estimate of the residual risk for all relevant categories, and any 
further comments or background on uncertainty associated with the assessment. Where 
appropriate, a follow up risk rating classification was completed after mitigating 
measures were assessed. Uncertainty in the assessment (or risk rating) as a result of 
knowledge base, random process, etc,. 
 
 
4.2.3.2 Modeling of accidental scenarios. 
 
One of the advantages of using an FSA approach is the ability to clearly illustrate the 
sequence of events that can take place or are required to take place for a failure to occur. 
This method effectively illustrates how resistant a system is to single or multiple 
initiating events. Figure 4.1 displays an example of the layout of an initiating event 
fault tree (ET). 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Event tree diagram example. 
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Event tree analysis (ETA) is a forward, bottom up, logical modeling technique for both 
success and failure that explores responses through a single initiating event and lays a 
path for assessing probabilities of the outcomes and overall system analysis. This 
analysis technique is used to analyze the effects of functioning or failed systems given 
that an event has occurred. This Technique may be applied to a system early in the 
design process to identify potential issues that may arise rather than correcting the 
issues after they occur. With this forward logic process use of ETA as a tool in risk 
assessment can help to prevent negative outcomes from occurring by providing a risk 
assessor with the probability of occurrence. 
 
The tree is constructed as follows: 
 
 Initiating event (IE): Failure or undesired event that initiates the start of an 
accident sequence. The IE may result in a mishap, depending upon successful 
operation of the hazard countermeasure methods designed into the system. 
 Pivotal events: Intermediary events between the IE and the ﬁnal mishap. These 
are the failure/success events of the design safety methods established to 
prevent the IE from resulting in a mishap. If a pivotal event works successfully, it 
stops the accident scenario and is referred to as a mitigating event. If a pivotal 
event fails to work, then the accident scenario is allowed to progress and is 
referred to as an aggravating event; 
 Outcomes: Series of events that ultimately result in an accident. The sequence of 
events begins with an initiating event and is (usually) followed by one or more 
pivotal events that lead to the undesired end state. 
 
 
4.2.4 Risk Quantification. 
 
Risk quantification is the process of evaluating the risks that have been identified and 
developing the data that will be needed for making decisions as to what should be done 
about them. Risk management is done from very early in the project until the very end. 
For this reason qualitative analysis should be used at some points in the project, and 
quantitative techniques should be used at other times. 
 
The procedure used to estimate both components and therefore the risk to the natural 
environment, described in the following sections. 
 
 
4.2.1.1 Estimation of Probability. 
 
Probability – A risk is an event that “may” occur. The probability of it occurring can 
range anywhere from just above 0 to just below 100 percent. During the risk analysis 
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the potential likelihood that a given risk will occur is assessed, and an appropriate risk 
probability is selected from the table below: 
 
 For the scenario of increasing water volume with rapid melting of glaciers. 
 
Table 4.3 Indicators of probability degree for glacier lake outburst after the increasing of 
water in a lake. 
Probability 
Category 
Probability 
(%) 
Valuation Description 
Very High 25-100 5 Risk event expected to occur 
High 19-24 4 Risk event more likely than not to occur 
Medium 13-18 3 Risk event may or may not occur 
Low 7-12 2 Risk event less likely than not to occur 
Very Low 0-6 1 Risk event not expected to occur 
(Note: It can’t be exactly 100 percent, because then it would be a certainty, not a risk. 
And it can’t be exactly 0 percent, or it wouldn’t be a risk.) 
 
 
 For the scenario of earthquake. 
 
Table 4.4 Indicators for deriving probability of occurrence for glacier lake outbursts 
after the earthquake. 
Probability 
Category 
Probability  Valuation Description 
Very High  4 Risk event expected to occur 
High  3 Risk event more likely than not to occur 
Medium  2 Risk event may or may not occur 
Low  1 Risk event less likely than not to occur 
(Note: Table created from seismic maps of Kyrgyzstan. It was developed by Institute of 
Seismology (Science Academy of Kyrgyz Republic)). 
 
 
 For the scenario of erosion. 
 
Table 4.5 Indicators for deriving probability of occurrence for glacier lake outburst after 
the erosion. 
Probability 
Category 
Range of Hydraulic 
shear stress        
Valuation The rate of increase of the 
crack. 
High >100 4 Very Rapid 
Medium 51-100 3 Moderately rapid 
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Low 21-50 2 Slow 
Very Low 1-20 1 Very Slow 
 
Probabilities of glacial hazards are difficult to quantify due to the small number of 
recorded events and limited statistical data set on the flood triggers. The above 
approaches rely on a detailed data set and are therefore most suited to study of known 
problem sites. For more information on how to determine if the risk is written in the 
next chapter. 
 
 
4.2.1.2 Estimation of consequence. 
 
Below are listed the criteria for the estimation of consequences of each scenario on the 
glacier lake outburst flood. 
 
Table 4.6 Scales of estimation of consequences. 
Quantity Hazard Extension   Range 
Very High Very High Very Extensive 4 
High High Extensive 3 
Medium Medium Low Extensive 2 
Low Low Not Extensive 1 
 
 
Quality of the 
environment 
Affected 
population 
Assets and 
production capital 
Range 
Very High >100 Very High 4 
High 25-100 High 3 
Medium 5-25 Medium 2 
Low 1-5 Low 1 
 
where:  Quantity - quantity of substance released into the environment. (ranging 
from 4 = very high to 1 = low); 
 
 Hazard - intrinsic hazard of the substance; harmful, toxic, cumulative, etc. 
(ranging from 4 = very high to 1 = low); 
 
 Extent - environmental area affected or persons affected by the impact. 
(ranging from 4 = very extensive to 1 = not extensive); 
4. RISK ASSESSMENT  
 
55 
 
  
Quality of the environment - (ranging from 4 = high, space protected to 
any degree and 1 = low quality); 
 
Affected population – (more than 100 persons - 4, between 25 and 100 - 3, 
between 5 and 25 - 2 and fewer - 1) 
 
  Assets and production capital - (ranging from 4 = very high to 1 = low). 
 
 
4.2.1.3 Estimation of damage. 
 
The estimate of the consequences is performed differently for the natural, human and 
socio-economic environment. We estimate the consequences or injury that each scenario 
produces in the environment, applying the following formulas: 
 
 Damages of natural environment (NE): 
 
                                                                       
 
 Socioeconomic damages (SE): 
 
                                                                      
 
 Human life loss damages (HL): 
 
                                                             
 
Severity estimation of the consequences will be made according to the following scales: 
 
Table 4.7 Scales of severity estimation. 
 Evaluation Value 
Critical 60-52 5 
Grave 51-43 4 
Moderate 42-31 3 
Light 30-22 2 
Negligible 21-15 1 
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4.2.1.4 Estimation of Risk 
 
Any evaluation has a subjective component associated factors: uncertainty of scientific 
knowledge, access to sufficient sources of information, existence of different and 
sometimes contradictory perceptions of the risks and severity, etc.; therefore, the risk 
assessment must adequately document the judgments and sources of information used. 
 
In any case, the risk assessment will be performed for each postulated accident scenario, 
from the evaluation of the damage associated with the result or effect for each 
environment and the frequency of occurrence of those consequences. Damage and 
frequency correspond to the two components of risk, which allow its estimation using 
the product of both referred to the type of result. 
 
Once the frequencies or probabilities of the different scenarios and possible 
consequences on the three possible environments have been determined, the risk 
estimate is made. 
 
For each scenario the probability (between 1 and 5) is multiplied by the severity of the 
consequences (between 1 and 5) obtaining a value between 1 and 25, 25; being the 
highest risk. This is for each of the analyzed environments. This gives three risk 
estimate values (one for each environment) and an overall value (the sum of these), 
giving the total risk for each scenario. 
 
                              
 
Where: The consequence is valued based on the natural, human and socio-economic 
environment. 
 
                                                       
 
Finally, three tables have been drawn up (one for each environment) indicating on their 
axes the probability or frequency of a scenario occurring and its gravity (both values 
range from 1 to 5). In these tables, all the possible scenarios detected including their risk 
evaluation are specified for each environment. 
 
Table 4.8 Scale of risk evaluation. 
Risk evaluation 
Very high risk 21-25  
High risk 16-20  
Medium risk 11-15  
Moderate risk 6-10  
Low risk 1-5  
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Scenarios in the table give an indication to assess risk and to suggest improvements in 
the management of risk reduction. 
 
Table 4.9 Risk analyzing table. 
Probability/Severity 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Low Low Low Moderate Medium 
2 Low Low Moderate Medium High 
3 Low Moderate Medium High Very 
High 
4 Moderate Medium High Very High Very 
High 
5 Medium High Very High Very High Very 
High 
 
 
Risks categorized on a scale, with the code, which includes guidance purpose only and 
as an example. 
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5. RISK ANALYSIS OF PETROV’S GLACIER LAKE 
OUTBURST FLOOD 
5.1 Identification of hazards. 
 
Failure of Petrov’s glacial lake dam can cause outburst flood and represent a serious 
hazard. The potential danger of outburst floods depends on various factors like the 
increasing of water volume, earthquake, erosion and morphometry of the glacier and its 
surrounding moraines and valley.  
 
In addition, a potential lake outburst is one of the causes of environmental disaster. The 
destruction of the tailings, which is located in the valley completely contaminate the 
largest river of the country. 
 
Petrov’s Glacial lake outburst flood is a biggest natural hazard in Kyrgyzstan. But it also 
has an industrial hazard such as tailing dam failure. This makes it difficult a risk 
analyzing. If in the first case it is necessary to determine the properties and identify 
potential sources of the accident, so in the second case, we determine the risk of impact 
to the environment. Also necessary to consider that possible sources of dangerous 
activities, processes, elements of the environment which can compromise the 
installation, organization, management of human resources and materials, and others. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Classification of hazards by origin. 
H
az
ar
d
 
Natural 
Atmospheric 
Storms, Hail, Tornadoes, 
Hurricanes, Fire. 
Hydrological 
Floods, Droughts, Erosion 
and Sedimentation 
Topological 
Avalanches, Landslides, 
Mudslides. 
Tectonic Earthquakes 
Industrial  (produced by 
man) 
Wars 
Disruption,  Growth in the 
volume of solid waste. 
Accidents 
Construction failures, 
Explosions, Fires. 
Pollution sources Waste, heavy metals. 
Epidemics Cholera, measles, AIDS 
Subversive actions Terrorism, Vandalism 
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5.1.1 Sources of hazards. 
 
Most of the information used in natural hazard assessments is generated by two steps: 
national and regional natural phenomena research and monitoring centers; disaster 
management entities; and sectoral planning agencies, ministries, and public utilities. 
 
Sources of Petrov’s GOLF hazard are hazards of regional or national levels. Examples of 
potential sources are listed in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 Sources of hazard and its potential damages on the Petrov GLOF. 
Sources of hazard Potential damage 
Rising water levels (ice melting, heavy 
rains) 
The problem of the stability of the 
moraine dam that could lead to flooding. 
Earthquakes The problem of the stability of the 
moraine dam that could lead to flooding. 
Also subsequent flooding of the tailings, 
settlements, water and soil pollution. 
Erosion (lateral water erosion) Destabilization of moraine dam which 
leads to flooding.  Also it can go by 
earthquake scenario. 
Deterioration of the membrane at the 
bottom of the tailings. Formation of pores 
and cracks on the membrane. (after glacier 
lake flooding) 
Contamination of the soil and 
groundwater. 
 
Petrov’s Glacier Lake is a basic threat of the Kumtor mine tailings. All of the factors 
described in 2 Charter raise concerns that the natural glacial moraine dam impounding 
Petrov’s Lake and the tailings dam below are both structurally unstable and could fail if 
a significant earthquake or erosion occurs. Many researchers of Kyrgyzstan prove that 
these conditions are extremely risky and could result in a catastrophic collapse of the 
Petrov’s Lake dam, which can also damage the Kumtor tailings pond. This can cause a 
rapid release of masses of contaminated water and soil (the tailings) into the Kumtor 
River, endangering downstream people, constructions, rivers, and would likely kill 
much of the mountain trout population and other aquatic organisms. Such a collapse 
could negatively-impact waters throughout much of the Naryn River basin.  
 
 
5.1.2.1 Rising water levels (ice melting, heavy rains). 
 
Depending on the rise of temperature and the melting of glaciers, the first moraine dam 
break scenario increases the potential impact on the tailings pond.  The water level in 
the lake is increasing every year, and thereby increasing the risk of destruction of the 
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tailings. If in 1957 the possibility flow of breakthrough wave was 168030,2793     , but 
now it is 2960118,715      (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4). In the following figures 
showed the possible reasons of scenario. 
 
  
 
Figure 5.2 Glacier lake outburst flood: a) by high temperature and glacier melting, b) by 
heavy rains. 
 
 
5.1.1.2 Earthquake. 
 
It should be noted that the seismic hazard can go both sequentially and in parallel. 
Because the earthquake can affect to moraine dam and tailings dam at the same time.  
The hazard of erosion can also go to a different sequence. First, can the collapse of the 
tailings and then getting into the river. Despite the options of event the loss or damage 
of the environment remains large. 
 
 
  
Figure 5.3 Glacier lake outburst flood: a) impact of the earthquake to the tailings pond.  
b) impact of the earthquake to the glacier lake. 
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Sequentially (Step by step) Parallel 
Accident  Source of Hazard Accident  Source of Hazard 
      
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 5.4 Possible scenarios on the Petrov’s lake in the earthquake. 
 
The state of moraine dam is the critical factor of the potential outburst in the case of 
Petrov’s Lake. However, the assessment procedure is of a preliminary nature because 
the precise conditions of potential outburst are unknown. 
 
 
5.1.1.3 Erosion. 
 
Glacier erosion can lead to a breakthrough lake. Most of the moraine dam is under 
water. Underwater movements can slowly reduce the thickness of the dam. The study 
of the underwater part of the lake is very expensive and difficult. Therefore, monitoring 
of the underwater part of the lake is conducted only once every two years. 
 
Moraine dam failure 
Drainage system 
failure 
Additional artificial 
dam failure 
Tailings dam failure 
Flooding, 
Destruction, 
Contamination of 
water   
Earthquake Moraine dam failure 
Drainage system 
failure 
Additional artificial 
dam failure 
Tailings dam failure 
Flooding, 
Destruction, 
Contamination of 
water   
Earthquake 
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Also Petrov’s glacier has several transverse crevasses and collapse features; they are 
calving into the lakes, although the collapsing masses of ice are not large enough to 
generate dangerous displacement waves. But in this case of Petrov glacier should be 
monitored for signs of instability as they could potentially produce ice blocks. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 5.5 Glacier lake outburst flood: a) by erosion in interglacial channel.  b) by 
erosion on the glacier tongue. 
 
5.1.1.4 Tailings pond failure after the GLOF. 
 
Kumtor tailings pond built to contain waste from gold mining, it is the largest tailings 
pond in the Kyrgyzstan.  The construction and care of a tailings dam is a main task to 
society and people which engaged in mining. Every year on the territory of tailings 
pond carried different monitorings.  The results from the last monitoring of the Kumtor 
tailings pond were discussed a main risks and methods of their solutions. At this time it 
has a several problems of safety. These are following risks: 
 
 Threat of glacial lake outburst, which may flood part of the tailings. 
 Hydrological factor is one of the most common causes of failure. The majority of 
failures are due to slope instability, seepage and erosion; all caused by a lack of 
control of the water balance. 
 Large earthquake risk might cause catastrophic failure of a tailings dam, with the 
release of a large amount of tailings, and could lead to long term environmental 
damage with huge cleanup costs. 
 
As mentioned above earthquake risk can be realized at the same time with Glacier lake 
destruction (Figure 5.4). It case can lead huge environmental damage and economic 
expenditure.  
 
Even if the tailings dam will not be destroyed, the water that falls on the surface of the 
tailings may cause the risk of erosion. Water can seep in and destroy a dam (Figure 5.6). 
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Figure 5.6 Tailings pong of Kumtor Gold Mine Company: a) panoramic photo; b) 
structure. 
 
And finally, there are two ways to contamination: a catastrophic failure, such as breach 
of the tailings dam, or a chronic low-level release, such as seepage over an extended 
period. 
  
Of all environmental risks posed by tailing ponds the most grave is a dam failure. The 
most critical element of any tailings impoundment is a dam. Stability of the tailings 
impoundments depends a number of factors: its design, location, presence of the 
geological and meteorological hazards in the region, etc. As a rule, major source of risk 
represents dams of older design. 
 
Tailings pond dams can fail because a number of natural hazards as well as natural 
hazards in combination with anthropogenic factors. Figure 5.7 represents non 
exhaustive variety of tailings impoundment failure reasons for Kyrgyzstan. 
 
One of the most common reasons of dam failures is pond overtopping due to improper 
water discharge. In the mountain environment this problem may be also caused by 
Petrov’s lake outburst flood. Secondly, mining wastes sites can be destroyed by 
landslides which are very frequent in some mountainous areas. Thirdly, an earthquake 
can certainly be a reason for a dam failure. The destruction of the dam may take place 
because of direct severe earthquake’s shock or as a result of the chain of events:  
 
                                                                     
                                                      
                                                    . 
 
                                                                     
                                           
                            
                                                            . 
 
 
Tailings slurry liquefaction as a result of repeated seismic shocks makes threat from 
earthquakes quite realistic. 
5. RISK ANALYSIS OF PETROV’S GLACIER LAKE OUTBURST 
 
64 
 
 
Figure 5.7 Simplified tailings impoundment fault tree: example of Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Therefore, such a diversity of factors which can cause destruction of a tailings pond 
located in the mountainous environment, rapidly at which released tailings can be 
transported downstream and their high chemical availability determine that high level 
of risk associated with mining wastes in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
 
5.1.2 Risk Evaluation. 
 
Risk evaluations were completed following the identification of risk scenarios and 
measurement of consequences. The evaluation of risk requires determining the 
acceptability of risk as defined through the different locations (or risk values) within the 
risk matrix developed for the risk assessment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tailings pond 
failure 
Overtopping 
Earthquake Landslide Flooding Mudflow 
Dam failure 
Landslide Earthquake Flooding Mudflow 
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Table 5.2 FMEAC for Petrov’s glaciar lake, failure modes, effects and methods of control and compensation. 
Function Failure 
Mode 
Potential Effects 
of Failure 
Failure 
Mechanisms 
Current Process 
Controls 
Compensatory 
measure 
Recommended 
Action(s) 
Petrov’s  glaciar lake 
Glaciers Melting 
glaciers. 
Rising 
water 
levels.  
Glacial Lake, 
Moraine dam, 
Possibility effect 
to tailings pond, 
Ground, 
Vegetation 
cover, 
The rapid 
melting of 
Petrov’s glacier, 
will raise the 
water level in the 
lake. 
Geotechnical control, 
Topographic control of 
moraine dam, 
topographic grid, 
deformation and ground 
movement. 
Find an 
alternative 
approach to 
artificial water 
removal. 
Artificial lowering 
of the water on the 
lake. Construction 
of drainage system. 
Premature slow 
destruction of the 
moraine dam. 
Glacial 
Lake, 
 
Earthquake Moraine dam, 
Possibility effect 
to tailings pond, 
Ground, 
Vegetation 
cover, 
Collapse of an 
ice dam. Water 
wave pressure,  
Geotechnical control, 
Topographic control of 
moraine dam, 
topographic grid, 
deformation and ground 
movement. Be informed 
with the closest 
seismological station. 
Frequently 
perform 
geotechnical, 
topographical 
monitoring, 
checking the 
stability of the 
dam. 
Artificial lowering 
of the water on the 
lake. Construction 
of drainage system. 
Premature slow 
destruction of the 
moraine dam. 
Glacial 
Lake 
Lateral 
water 
erosion. 
Moraine dam Water effects on 
the lower part of 
the moraine 
dam. Formacion 
of grietas, 
carcavas. 
Using the geotechnical 
monitoring (stability 
analysis of moraine 
dam), which determine 
displacement of dam.  
Depending on 
the seriousness 
of the need to 
strengthen 
damaged areas. 
Artificial lowering 
of the water on the 
lake. Construction 
of drainage system. 
Premature slow 
destruction of the 
moraine dam. 
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Table 5.3  FMEA for “Kumtor” tailings pond, failure modes, effects and methods of control and compensation. 
Function Failure Mode Potential 
Effects of 
Failure 
Failure Mechanisms Current Process 
Controls 
Compensatory 
measure 
Recommended 
Action(s) 
“Kumtor” Tailings pond 
Tailing 
dam 
Glacial Lake 
Outburst Flow, 
 
Contaminati
on of 
ground 
water, 
surface 
water, soil, 
air, 
vegetation 
cover. 
Possibility tailings 
dam failure after the 
Petrov’s Lake 
flooding. 
Using the 
geotechnical 
monitoring (stability 
analysis of moraine 
and also tailing dam), 
which determine 
displacement of dam. 
Depending on the 
severity of the 
collapse of the dam, 
it is necessary to 
strengthen it. At the 
same time prevent 
large contamination. 
Premature to 
strengthen the 
dam. Continuous 
quality control 
dam. 
Geotechnical and 
other 
monitoring’s. 
Tailings 
pond 
Deterioration 
of the 
membrane at 
the bottom of 
the tailings. 
Formation of 
pores and 
cracks on the 
geomembrane. 
Effect to 
ground 
water, soil. 
The membranes have 
a useful life of 20 to 
30 years according to 
the material and the 
external conditions 
so that if after this 
time will not be 
replaced, pores, tears 
or other problems 
that would cause an 
outflow of liquid 
may appear. 
Monitoring the state 
of the membrane, and 
internal conditions 
that affect and 
monitor their age. 
Replacing of 
membrane 
Replacing of  
membrane 
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5.1.3 Modeling Scenarios. 
 
For modeling risk scenarios was used the Reliability Workbench 11.0 software which 
served for the construction of several event tree (ET). 
 
Event tree analysis (ETA) is an analysis technique for identifying and evaluating the 
sequence of events in a potential accident scenario following the occurrence of an 
initiating event. ETA utilizes a visual logic tree structure known as an event tree (ET). 
The objective of ETA is to determine whether the initiating event will develop into a 
serious mishap or if the event is sufficiently controlled by the safety systems and 
procedures implemented in the system design. An ETA can result in many different 
possible outcomes from a single initiating event, and it provides the capability to obtain 
a probability for each outcome. 
 
The ETA is a very powerful tool for identifying and evaluating all of the system 
consequence paths that are possible after an initiating event occurs. The ETA model will 
show the probability of the system design resulting in a safe operation path, a degraded 
operation path, and an unsafe operation path. 
 
The purpose of ETA is to evaluate all of the possible outcomes that can result from an 
initiating event. Generally, there are many different outcomes possible from an 
initiating event, depending upon whether design safety systems work properly or 
malfunction when needed. ETA provides a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of the 
risk associated with each potential outcome. 
 
The following are advantages of the ETA technique: 
 
 Structured, rigorous, and methodical approach. 
 A large portion of the work can be computerized. 
 Can be effectively performed on varying levels of design detail. 
 Visual model displaying cause/effect relationships. 
 Relatively easy to learn, do, and follow. 
 Models complex system relationships in an understandable manner. 
 Follows fault paths across system boundaries. 
 Combines hardware, software, environment, and human interaction. 
 Permits probability assessment. 
 
The following are disadvantages of the ETA technique: 
 
 An ETA can only have one initiating event; therefore multiple ETAs will be 
required to evaluate the consequence of multiple initiating events. 
 ETA can overlook subtle system dependencies when modeling the events. 
 Partial successes/failures are not distinguishable. 
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Petrov’s glacier lake  
 
 
Figure 5.8 Event Tree for Petrov's GLOF consequences associated with increasing of water on the lake. 
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Figure 5.9 Event Tree for Petrov's GLOF consequences associated with  earthquake. 
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Figure 5.10 Event Tree for Petrov's GLOF consequences associated with ice erosion in the moraine dam. 
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Tailings pond 
 
  
Figure 5.11 Event Tree for tailings pond consequences associated with Petrov's GLOF. 
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5.2 Risk quantification. 
For risk assessment were used initiating events (IE). Also, one of the pivotal event 
"TAILING DAM" was used. The Pivotal events such as «ADDITIONAL ARTIFICIAL 
DAM» and «DRAINAGE SYSTEM» depend on the volume of water. They are work if 
the breakthrough wave of water less than 8000  /s, with a >8000  /s probability of 
retention breakthrough is minimal or zero. 
5.2.1 Estimation of probability. 
The risk assessment will be performed for each accident scenario, from the assessment 
associated with the consequence or effect for each environment. 
 
 The scenario of GLOF after the increasing water volume on the lake. 
 
The monitoring of Glacier Lake is totally based on different types and dates of satellite 
images. The data set images of 1950s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000 and 2006 of Ak Shiyrak glacier 
were used (Table 3.2.). Least snow cover and cloud free satellite images were selected 
for lake area measurement. Least snow cover in the Tian Shan occurs generally in the 
summer season (May-September). But during this season, clouds will block the views. If 
snow precipitation is late in the year, winter images are also suitable except for the 
problem of long relief shadows in the high mountain regions. The frozen lake always 
has a level at the toe of the Petrov’s  glacier tongue. 
 
The lake area     is determined in the same manner as the length       The upper      
and lower      absolutely height of dam      allows to determine the height of the 
dam (Figure 3.3). 
                         
 
Table 5.4 Characteristics of Petrov’s Lake changing (period 1957-2013). 
Year Dam 
Height 
       
Average 
depth 
       
Volume 
       
Area 
       
Flow outburst 
wave. 
       
  
1957 43 2,5 960009,9387 960000 168030,2793 
1980 3,75 44032005,16 1830000 1733397,305 
1990 4,5 56303218,6 2340000 2013838,411 
1999 10 67371381,21 2800000 2246825,684 
2006 17,5 91432595,67 3800000 2706892,411 
2013 18 105869319,5 4400000 2960118,715 
 
All data were taken from the catalog of glacial lakes in Central Asia. Flow outburst 
wave was calculated by Costa formula:  
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Where:        - Flow outburst wave; 
      - Dam height; 
    - Volume of water; 
 
 
Figure 5.12 Increasing of water volume on the Petrov’s lake (period 1957-2013). 
 
In order to predict the probability of GLOF of Petrov’s lake, the values in Table 5.5  
were used as inputs for McKillop and Clague’s regression model. Inputting the data 
presented in Table 5.6 to Clague’s regression analysis shown in next equation showed 
the probability of GLOF to be equal to: 
 
  {    [          ∑                  ∑            ]}
  
  (2) 
 
Table 5.5 Clague’s regression’  variables. 
№ Variable Symbol Value Unit Definition 
1 Lake area   4.4     Lake surface area 
2 Moraine height 
to width ratio 
    43/280 
(0.1536) 
- Ratio between moraine height 
and moraine width. 
3 Ice-cored 
moraine 
        1 - Moraine dam type 
4 Main rock type 
forming 
moraine 
         1 - Bedrock lithology surrounding 
and/or upstream of lake— 
granitic, volcanic, sedimentary, 
metamorphic 
Note: Values for     and   were measured directly from LADSAT 7;  
        is assigned a value of 1 if ice exists in the moraine and 0 if there is none;  
         is assigned a value of 1 for granitic, volcanic, sedimentary, or metamorphic 
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material, and 0 for any other material.   is the intercept,             and are  regression 
coefficients. 
 
Table 5.6 Regression coefficients estimated for the outburst probability model. 
Variable Category Coefficient 
          - -7.1074     
    - 9.4581      
        Ice-free 
Ice-cored 
1.2321 (         ) 
-1.2321              
  - 0.0159      
         Granitic 
Volcanic 
Sedimentary 
Metamorphic 
1.5764 (         ) 
3.1461             
3.7742 (            ) 
-8.4968 (            ) 
  
The probability of the outburst was described qualitatively in order to avoid giving the 
impression of unrealistic precision. This was especially important, since the model was 
created using a long-term study. 
 
 
  {    [                        ∑                         ∑          ]}
  
          
 
 
According to the parameters set by McKillop and Clague, a ‘high’ probability of GLOF 
is defined as one between (0.17) 17% and (0.24) 24%, so our calculations predict a high 
probability of outburst at Petrov’s Lake. 
 
Table 5.7 Indicators of probability degree for Petrov’s GLOF by increasing of water on 
the lake. 
Probability 
Category 
Probability 
(%) 
Valuation Description 
Very High 25-100 5 Risk event expected to occur 
High 19-24 4 Risk event more likely than not to occur 
Medium 13-18 3 Risk event may or may not occur 
Low 7-12 2 Risk event less likely than not to occur 
Very Low 0-6 1 Risk event not expected to occur 
 
 
 
5. RISK ANALYSIS OF PETROV’S GLACIER LAKE OUTBURST 
 
75 
 
 
 The scenario of GLOF after the earthquake. 
 
Another reason of Petrov’s Lake GLOF is seismically active region. Earthquakes 
are frequently occurring types of natural disasters in the region.  
 
Earthquakes take place unexpectedly and are often followed by secondary phenomena 
(landslides, rockfalls, fires, etc.). Almost the whole territory of Kyrgyzstan is prone to 
high seismic hazards. Approximately 20% of the total area of the country (40,000     ) 
is prone to potential earthquakes of high intensity, and in the 158,000     of the 
territory (79%) earthquakes of medium intensity. 
 
The Earthquake probability map was created by researchers of Institute of Seismology 
(Science Academy of Kyrgyz Republic). 
 
The below map of seismic hazards shows the expansion of territories prone to 
earthquakes with indication of various intensities where four levels of seismic hazard 
prone areas are identified. Virtually all highlighted zones and subzones in the map 
represent high degree of risk to the population.  
 
 Level I seismic hazard zones include mountain slopes of high and middle 
altitude relief layers of Kyrgyz Tien-Shan ridge. 
 Level II seismic hazard zones include the low altitude mountain and hillside 
valleys in the number of intermountain valleys.  
 Level III seismic hazard zones include almost all of the valleys in the Kyrgyzstan. 
 Level IV seismic hazard zones include high mountainous areas. 
 
Figure 5.13 Seismic hazard map of the Kyrgyz Republic. 
 
According to the Institute of Seismology Petrov’s lake is located on the territory of 
"medium" seismic hazard zone. 
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Table 5.8 Indicators for deriving probability of occurrence for Petrov’s GLOF by 
earthquake. 
Probability 
Category 
Probability Valuation Description 
Very High  4 Risk event expected to occur 
High  3 Risk event more likely than not to occur 
Medium  2 Risk event may or may not occur 
Low  1 Risk event less likely than not to occur 
 
 
 The scenario of GLOF after the ice erosion. 
 
The Petrov lake’s moraine dam has a several thermokarst cracks which weaken the 
stability of the dam. They are the result of lateral erosion. Long-term underwater 
movement, exterior temperature, and other processes could create the conditions for 
occurrence of cracks. Recently appeared on the surface of the dam is another lake. 
Volume of the lake is 750 000  . Maximal depth is 22 m. Average depth is 8.5 m. This 
lake can pose a major threat to dam safety. 
 
Every year on the territory of the lake conducted geophysical measurements to monitor 
the stability of the dam. The latter study shown that the average increase of the crack 
hydraulic stress is 7.63     . This index can be identified by the following formula. 
 
  
       
   
          
 
Where:    - hydraulic shear stress in      
     - density of water in     
 ; 
    - acceleration due to gravity =        ; 
     - head loss in crack due to friction in ; 
    – length of crack in ; 
    – width of crack in ;   
 
In the Table 5.9 showed the data for the last 13 years. 
 
Table 5.9 Petrov’s lake dam stability data on the last periods (2001-2013). 
Year Water 
density  
  
  
  
  
Acceleration 
due to 
gravity 
       
Head 
loss in 
crack 
due to 
friction 
    
Length 
of crack 
    
Width 
of 
crack 
    
Hydraulic 
shear stress 
   
 
  
  
2001 999,7 9,8 3 8 0,01 6,102819767 
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2002 999,8 9,8 3 8,2 0,01 5,954566081 
2003 999,7 9,8 3 8,5 0,015 8,601457419 
2004 999,7 9,8 3 8,5 0,015 8,601457419 
2005 999,75 9,8 3,5 9 0,015 8,129783073 
2006 999,7 9,8 3,5 9 0,015 8,129376482 
2007 999,7 9,8 4 9,4 0,015 7,787599693 
2008 999,7 9,8 4 9,6 0,015 7,625358032 
2009 999,8 9,8 5 9,8 0,015 7,476071785 
2010 999,7 9,8 5 10 0,015 7,325817547 
2011 999,7 9,8 5,5 12 0,02 8,134636171 
2012 999,7 9,8 6 12,6 0,02 7,749612403 
2013 999,7 9,8 6 13 0,02 7,511162791 
 
According to Table of Bonelli and Brivois can determine the degree of risk of outburst 
flood. The average value of the hydraulic shear stress in the range of "very low", it 
means that haven’t risk on the erosion scenario. 
 
Table 5.10 Approximate estimates of range of shear stress. 
Probability 
Category 
Range of Hydraulic 
shear stress        
Valuation The rate of increase of the 
crack. 
High >100 4 Very Rapid 
Medium 51-100 3 Moderately rapid 
Low 21-50 2 Slow 
Very Low 1-20 1 Very Slow 
 
 
 The scenario with the tailings pond. 
 
“Kumtor mine” Tailings Management Facility (TMF) consists of tailings pipelines, 
tailings dam, Effluent Treatment Plant (ETP), and diversion ditches. The pulp from the 
Mill is transported by gravity in one of the pipelines (7 km length). The tailings 
continued to be discharged and contained in a single tailings basin created by the 
construction of tailings dam across the former river, in the lower part of its valley. A 
synthetic geo-membrane anti-filtration liner was placed on the upstream side of the 
dam to prevent erosion, seepage, freezing of dam body. 
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Figure 5.14 Tailings pond construction. 
 
The reasons for employing geomembranes for containment facilities are all based on the 
reduction of leakage and the resulting reduction in “failure” risk that comes with better 
containment; with the definition of “failure” including structural failure, environmental 
contamination and inadequate water supply. 
 
The most common types of geomembrane typically used in the mining industry are 
high density polyethylene (HDPE), linear low density polyethylene (LLDPE) and 
polyvinyl chloride (PVC). These products are listed in order of increasing flexibility and 
decreasing strength. The thicknesses of the both types of polyethylene (PE) liners 
typically run from 1.0 to 2.0 mm, while PVC is typically 0.50 to 1.0 mm thick. The high 
density polyethylene HDPE material used by “Kumtor” mine Tailings Management 
Facility (TMF) warranted till 30 years. If the first membrane were laid in 1996 then now 
it is already 18 years old. It is very important to keep in mind.  According to that the life 
cycle of a geomembrane not yet expired. The risk of leakage of pollutants on soil is not 
large. In this case it is possible to give the "low" range. 
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Table 5.11 Estimation of the probability for the Petrov lake outburst flood and tailings pond failure. 
Accident scenario Damage Consequence 
Quantity of 
accidents 
Assets and 
production 
capital 
Affected 
population 
Probability 
Rising of water 
Flooding camps, 
bridges, roads, tailings 
pond. Soil erosion. 
Environmental losses. 
Economic losses. 
Destabilization of the 
moraine dam, which will 
lead outburst a lot of 
volume of water from the 
lake. 
2 2 2 4 
Earthquake 2 2 2 2 
Erosion 2 2 2 1 
Tailings pond 
failure 
Pollution of ground 
water, soil, flora, fauna 
and people. 
Seepage of pollutants 
through the 
geomembrane. 
4 4 3 2 
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5.2.2 Estimation of consequence. 
 
The materialization of a risk can lead to different consequences. For this reason, the 
estimate of the result shall be based on the impact of environmental liability on health, 
environmental quality and safety of the population. 
 
The estimation of the consequences is determined by the sum of the values obtained in 
the following variables: 
 
 Quantity - The quantity is determined according by the analysis of the variables 
"quantity of waste", which will get into the Naryn river from tailings pond. 
 
Table 5.12 Scale of “quantity”.  
Quantity of waste Quantity Range 
>500 tones Very High 4 
50-500 tones High 3 
5-49 tones Medium 2 
<5 tones Low 1 
 
 Hazard - is understood as an intrinsic ability of the substance to cause harm, its 
toxicity, its potential accumulation. 
 
Table 5.13 Scale of “hazard”.  
Hazard Hazard evaluation Range 
Very toxic Very High 4 
Toxic High 3 
Low toxic Medium 2 
No toxic Low 1 
 
 Extension is a factor is based on the distance between the person and the people 
who are potentially affected. 
 
Table 5.14 Scale of “extension” 
Extension Extension Range 
Presence of population is located in the same place 
of accident. 
Very Extensive 4 
Presence of population is within a radius <0.5 km Extensive 3 
Presence of population is within a radius 0.5 - 1 
km 
Low Extensive 2 
Presence of population is within a radius >1 km Not Extensive 1 
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 The Quality of the environment is determined depending on the reference 
standard set.  
 
Table 5.15 Estimation of quality of the environment. 
Quality of the environment Range 
Very High 4 
High 3 
Medium 2 
Low 1 
 
 Affected population is based on the number of people who are potentially 
affected at risk. 
 
Table 5.16 Determination and estimation of affected population.  
Affected population Range 
>100 4 
25-100 3 
5-25 2 
1-5 1 
 
 Assets and production capital is based on the total cost of constructions, roads, 
bridges which are potentially affected at risk. 
 
Table 5.17 Determination and estimation of affected assets and production capital. 
Assets and production capital Range 
Very High 4 
High 3 
Medium 2 
Low 1 
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5.2.3 Estimation of damage. 
 
Table 5.18 Estimation of the damage for the Petrov lake outburst flood and tailings pond failure. 
Accident 
scenario 
Damage 
Q
u
a
n
ti
ty
 
H
a
z
a
rd
 
E
x
te
n
t 
Quality of 
environment 
Assets and 
production 
capital 
Affected 
population 
D
a
m
a
g
e
s 
o
f 
th
e
 N
E
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
s 
o
f 
S
E
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
s 
o
f 
th
e
 H
L
 
Rising of 
water Flooding camps, 
bridges, roads, 
tailings. Soil erosion. 
Environmental losses. 
Economic losses. 
3 3 1 2 2 2 10 12 12 
Earthquake 3 3 1 2 2 2 10 12 12 
Erosion 3 3 1 2 2 2 10 12 12 
Tailings pond 
failure 
Pollution of ground 
water, soil, flora, 
fauna and people. 
4 4 3 4 3 2 19 18 17 
 
5. RISK ANALYSIS OF PETROV’S GLACIER LAKE OUTBURST 
 
83 
 
5.2.4 Risk estimation 
The estimation of the severity is made from the Table 4.7 Scales of severity estimation. 
 
When the quantification of risk for each scenario at each site will be observed: 
Table 5.19 Risk quantification of the Petrov glacier lake outburst flood.  
Accident scenario Damage Probability 
Damage 
Severity 
Risk 
Damages 
of the NE 
Damages 
of SE 
Damages 
of the HL 
Value Range 
Rising of water 
Flooding camps, 
bridges, roads, tailings. 
Soil erosion. 
Environmental losses. 
Economic losses. 
4 10 12 12 3 12 
Medium 
risk 
Earthquake 2 10 12 12 3 6 
Moderate 
risk 
Erosion 1 10 12 12 3 3 Low risk 
Tailings pond failure. 
Pollution of ground 
water, soil.  flora, fauna 
and people. 
2 19 18 17 5 10 
Moderate 
risk 
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Risks categorized on a scale, with the code, which includes guidance. 
Table 5.20 Scale of risk evaluation. 
Risk evaluation 
Very high risk 21-25  
High risk 16-20  
Medium risk 11-15  
Moderate risk 6-10  
Low risk 1-5  
 
The estimation of rik for each scenario was performed as multiply the probability {1-
5) by the severity of the consequences {1-5), resulting in a value between 1 and 25, 
where 1 the lowest risk and 25 the highest risk. 
 
Table 5.21 Location of risk, the probability and severity for the accident scenarios. 
S
ev
er
it
y
 
Probability 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1      
2   
GLOF from 
Earthquake 
  
3 
GLOF from 
Erosion 
  
GLOF from 
Rising of 
water 
 
4      
5  
Tailings 
pond failure 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Global climate warming causes an intensive melting and retreat of glaciers in 
mountains areas over the world. This process is evident also in mountain regions of 
the Northern and Inner Tien-Shan. Melting water of glaciers inﬂuences changes in 
hydrological regime of water streams and causes overﬁlling of high mountain lakes 
basins. The dams of many lakes are very unstable and they often burst. The increase 
of the surface and volume of the Petrov Lake represents potential natural hazard. In 
case of the lake outburst, ﬂooding of a disposal site of highly toxic waste from the 
gold mine Kumtor is a real threat. If this happens, the toxic waste containing 
cyanides could contaminate a large area in the valley of the Naryn River. 
 
To solve these problems requires perform some conclusions presented in this thesis. 
 
 Monitoring of lake and tailings pond. 
Monitoring GLOF hazard levels requires a multi-staged, interdisciplinary approach 
using multi-temporal data sets. Key indicators include changes in the lakes and their 
impoundments which should be observed using different data sets at varying time 
scales to evaluate glacier hazard and stability of moraine dams. Also, must to control 
exterior factors which affect to Kumtor tailings pond. 
 
 Artificial reduction of water in the lake. 
The most important mitigation measure is to reduce the volume of water in the lake, 
thus reducing the magnitude of the possible peak discharge at the time of breach. 
Structural mitigation measures can also be applied downstream to protect 
infrastructure from peak floods. 
 
The volume of water can be reduced by means of one or more of the following: 
controlled breaching of the moraine dam; construction of an outlet control structure; 
pumping or siphoning the water from the lake; and tunnelling through the moraine 
barrier or under an ice dam. 
 
Preventative measures can also be carried out around the lake to secure against 
potential threats such as loose rocks or snow/ice avalanches that could trigger 
displacement waves. 
 
 Awareness Raising. 
The local community needs to become more aware of GLOF hazards and ways and 
means to respond to warnings. It is important to continue dissemination of accurate 
information to the public, and raising of public awareness on glacial lakes and GLOF 
risk management, through a variety of means such as press reports, TV programmes, 
radio programmes, news articles, and scientific forums for public awareness. 
 
 Need for a National Policy 
In view of the very high, if unpredictable, hazard involved, it is imperative that a 
national policy be developed for increasing awareness, early warning, and risk 
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mitigation. This could then be used as a template for application to the entire Tien 
Shan region. Furthermore, immediate action is urged along the following lines: 
increase of public awareness; more extensive vulnerability assessment; routine 
airborne and satellite monitoring; and more intensive and repeat geophysical survey. 
There also remains the inherent danger of trans-international level that requires 
international cooperation. Region-wide cooperation throughout the Central Asia 
should follow, and it is recommended that steps be taken to organise a region-wide 
planning session for experts and leaders of relevant national institutions to develop a 
more coordinated approach and begin laying the foundations for a glacial lake 
outburst risk reduction policy. 
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